I'm reading Sabina Lovibond's book "Ethical Formation". She writes that moral judgments seem to possess two features: Practicality and Objectivity. Some philosophers think that these two features are incompatible.
I don't understand why some philosophers think that these two features are incompatible. Can someone explain me why these two features may be incompatible?
Here are some fragments written by Lovibond:
But it is unclear how moral judgement can possess both [practicality and objectivity], because the very idea of objectivity can seem to conflict with that of an internal relation between judgement and action.
I don't understand why the idea of objectivity seems to conflict with that of an internal relation between judgement and action.
If Hume was right to protest against the attempted derivation of “ought” from “is,” then we had better respect the thought on which his protest was based — namely, that awareness of how things stand in a reality independent of the thinking subject is compatible, indifferently, with any motivational attitude towards the reality apprehended (including a simple lack of interest).
I believe that Lovibond is here trying to explain why objectivity seems to conflict with the internal relation between judgement and action. However, I still don't see the conflict. Can someone 'translate' for me, what Lovibond is saying?