When someone assumes there's something, the general consensus is that it means there was nothing, and he added a layer of "somethingness". I'd like to question that and ask, when someone argues that "nothing" is, in the rational thinking "steps", before "something", is that really true?

I know that Spinoza argued against such thinking (don't remember the quote but it's something around this) - when we think, the consensus is that we have an empty "bubble" of thought, and then a thought pops into this "bubble" (similar to the idea of void, vacuum). But Spinoza says that isn't true, when we start thinking we "create" this "bubble" at the same "logical step". [I might be totally wrong and Spinoza was thinking the exact opposite and just brought this idea to reject it, I sincerely don't remember, so correct me in the comments please.]

Now with this line of thought - can we say that assuming something is exactly like assuming nothing? Can we go from here, to also state that the thinking of "not assuming" is epistemologically impossible, because even when we think we don't assume anything, we are actually assuming "nothing"?

Note- this is an epistemological question, and it has deep connection (that's originally what brought me to this question) to the "creationism" against the atheistic "rational thinking" that the Big Bang theory brought upon us.

  • I don't understand your first paragraph. You might be gesturing at the controversy surrounding Heidegger's "The Nothing itself nothings." But that's specific to Heidegger, not any kind of "general consensus." And even in the context of Heidegger (or Carnap's critique of Heidegger), I don't understand how to parse your question. What does "that" refer to in "is that really true?"? – Dan Hicks Feb 17 '18 at 23:07
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    @DanHicks generally, when we talk about "something" and "nothing", the logical steps assumed are nothing->something, as in nothing will be the most basic thing while something is the second step ("I have a ball in my hand" goes logically as "empty hand"->"ball in my hand"). – Yechiam Weiss Feb 17 '18 at 23:41
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    @DanHicks saying "I have a ball in my hand", more precisely, presuppose I "have a hand", therefore we have two steps right? (one could argue there's even another step - "I have a hand"->"there's a ball"->"I have that ball in my hand"). – Yechiam Weiss Feb 18 '18 at 9:59
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    @DanHicks so, my argument would be that there's no need to separate (a) having a hand (b) having a ball in my hand, but rather only (A) having a ball in my hand - I don't need to assume (a), the same statement (A) gives me both (a) and (b). I hope this clarifies my question. The existence of my hand is given at the same time as I state the existence of the ball in my hand. – Yechiam Weiss Feb 18 '18 at 16:48
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    @DanHicks OK, I didn't want to take it there, but that's the best example I have - when we talk about God and science we usually say that the more "rational" thinking is that God is something that needs to be proven, and the "default" position is that there isn't one (and here - the "default" position is that there is "nothing", and the position that requires "something" is the one that needs to prove itself). – Yechiam Weiss Feb 18 '18 at 18:05

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