Your understanding is right. But that was not obvious even to Popper.
He initially did not see how he could consider evolution to meet his demarcation criterion either. He initially described it as not qualifying as a theory
"Darwinism is not a testable scientific theory, but a metaphysical research program—a possible framework for testable scientific theories."
But then he got a better grasp on fossils and genetics.
The genetic theory solidifies a mechanism for evolution, and things like the sequencing of mutations, could easily turn out to be inconsistent with one another, which would contradict evolution severely.
So Popper later argued that together genetics and Darwinism constitute a single falsifiable theory.
"When speaking here of Darwinism, I shall speak always of today's theory—that is Darwin's own theory of natural selection supported by the Mendelian theory of heredity"...
But in reality, evolution is falsifiable on the basis on which Darwin put it forward. It would be controverted by a large enough contradiction in the fossil record. This would be new data, not in the sense of actually coming from a later period of history, but of being discovered later. Since new fossil finds keep turning up new species, whenever one does, evolution has been presented with an opportunity for falsification.
Popper eventually understood that, and decided evolution could in fact stand on its own as an independent real theory.
"I have changed my mind about the testability and logical status of the theory of natural selection; and I am glad to have an opportunity to make a recantation."
But shortly after Popper, with Kuhn and Lakatos, it became obvious that historically, science also chooses to confirm, even in the presence of annoying anomalies. So this framing turns out to be an unfortunate way of looking at this distinction.
Popper's notion that this is the way science actually works -- that a single contradiction should dispose of a theory, and that any theory must therefore be disposable at any point in time -- is just not realistic, and contradicts history.
Popper himself notes that this internal inconsistency is normal, having once written:
... There seem to be exceptions, as with so many biological theories; and considering the random character of the variations on which natural selection operates, the occurrence of exceptions is not surprising. ...
So it seems odd that he would place so much weight on direct falsification.
From an historical POV, every science spends much of its time in what Kuhn calls 'normal progress' (or just 'normal science') where it tries to fill gaps and minimize contradictions. That means that the theory abides contradictions as a normal state. It works toward both consistency and completeness, instead of working toward completeness and constantly discarding chunks due to contradictions.
Theoretical falsifiability remains an important principle, determining when we have a real theory, as opposed to an overgrown observation that does not have real theoretical value. But the actual event of falsification is just not something that happens.
The important distinction between Freudianism and Evolution is that the anomalies we see in Evolution look like anomalies, and not like solutions. An anomaly in a theory that is not rigid enough to be theoretically falsifiable looks like an extension of the theory. It always grows and never admits its weak points. The fact that not all of the evidence in biology is completely consistent is not a weakness. Instead it proves that biology is taking the job of explanation seriously.
