Resemblance and non-resemblance
Locke does not present his position along the exact line of argument you define but there is a strong likeness between your account and his of concepts that resemble reality and concepts that do not.
Locke thought that some of our concepts 'resemble' the things they are concepts of, and that others do not. Our concepts of primary qualities resemble qualities possessed by objects and our concepts of secondary qualities do not. Concepts of secondary qualities derive from the interaction between an object's primary qualities and our sensory apparatus. Barry Stroud explains in more detail :
Locke was a follower of the 'corpuscular philosophy' of Boyle and others,
according to which the physical world is composed of a large number of
solid atoms with size, shape, position, and motion or rest, but without
colour, sound, odour, hardness, or heat. In saying that our ideas of the
primary qualities of things 'resemble' qualities possessed by objects in the
world but that our ideas of secondary qualities do not he was simply ex-
pressing the scientific view that everything that happens in the world,
including our perceiving the colours, sounds, odours, and so on that we do,
is caused by the action of physical particles possessing only primary qualities of the sort listed. We do have ideas of such qualities, and all objects do
possess such qualities. But what, in an object, correspond to our ideas of
secondary qualities are only the powers the object possesses, in virtue of
the primary qualities of its fundamental parts, to produce certain ideas in
sentient beings who come into contact with it. In advancing this view Locke
was not concerned with the problem of how we can reliably tell that things
really are as they appear to be, nor did he argue for the asymmetry between
our ideas of primary qualities and those of secondary qualities on the
ground that familiar facts about the 'relativity' of perception hold for the
latter but not for the former. He simply supposed, quite reasonably, that
only the kinds of qualities referred to in physical explanations 'are really in
them,-whether any one's senses perceive them or no: and therefore may
be called real [or original or primary] qualities, because they really exist in those bodies'. (Barry Stroud, 'Berkeley v. Locke on Primary Qualities', Philosophy, Vol. 55, No. 212 (Apr., 1980), pp. 149-166 : 150.)
Frege's problem
Frege raises a problem about correspondence which is relevant to resemblance :
A correspondence, moreover, can only be perfect
if the corresponding things coincide and are, therefore, not
distinct things at all. It is said to be possible to establish the
authenticity of a banknote by comparing it stereoscopically with
an authentic one. But it would be ridiculous to try to compare
a gold piece with a twenty-mark note stereoscopically. It
would only be possible to compare an idea with a thing if the
thing were an idea too. And then, if the first did correspond
perfectly with the second, they would coincide. But this is not
at all what is wanted when truth is defined as the correspondence
of an idea with something real. For it is absolutely essential
that the reality be distinct from the idea. But then there can
be no complete correspondence, no complete truth. (G. Frege, 'The
Thought : A Logical Inquiry', Mind, New Series, Vol. 65, No. 259 (Jul., 1956), pp. 289-311 : 291.)
The point is that, to adapt Frege's language, a concept can strictly resemble only a concept. The concept of a primary quality cannot strictly resemble the primary quality itself. The concept has no 'size, shape, position, and motion or rest'. If this is so, then Locke's basis for distinguishing between primary and secondary qualities collapses. He does not believe that concepts of secondary qualities resemble anything in the object; and it turns out that concepts of primary qualities cannot do so.
