I am reading a paper right now by Andrey V. Smirnov, published in the journal Philosophy East and West, Vol. 43, No. 1 titled Nicholas of Cusa and Ibn Arabi: Two Philosophies of Mysticism. Both thinkers had theories about the paradoxical nature of God, in that God is not Being, but as a result is still defined by Being, so is not not-Being, etc.
To set up the logic behind this, Smirnov says "two possibilities exist to construct propositions that do not predicate something to the subject. To avoid something you must turn it either into everything or into nothing (nothing and everything are not something definite and so do not contradict the condition that the proposition about God should be indefinite)."
Is this right? He says later on on the same page (66) that in the case of God as everything, "no limit can ever reach the Divine essence because, since it embraces everything, there is nothing exterior to it... [it] contains every possible limit within itself and by that very fact transcends all limits."
Aren't we still in the same loop, so to speak? If God embraces everything, then isn't God a "thing" that just embraces everything else? Otherwise we would need to say that God embraces itself, right? And that seems contradictory? If something "embraces" the totality then that totality is not in fact a totality for something could encompass it, and neither is the thing that encompasses it for if encompassing can happen that implies separation (God as 1 and world as 1 coming together to create 2). Of course, perhaps this is just bad language on the part of the author? Does he just mean that God is the totality? But then in that case it is still defined by everything within it, and so must partake in its limits, no?
The problem seems to be right there in the quote when he says that everything and nothing are not "something" definite. Even there, trying to define them as indefinite, he cannot help but refer to them as things.
He says later, "To sum up, God is indefinable in the first case because God embraces all the limits." Are we not here positing a limit that embraces the limit, which would requires something else to embrace it, and so on and so on?
As I understand these thinkers, they both take a dialetheic stance towards the issue. They are accepting both A and not-A, B and not-B, and not trying to reject either, which seems to be the way Smirnov is outlining it. He is looking for an indefinite way to describe a thing, rather than admitting that perhaps the thing has a truth-value gap? Do I have that right?