In what sense can moral propositions be objective?

Question

There are many who assert that morality or moral principles are "objective," by which they mean that to say that, (1) "theft is wrong," is just as true as propositions like, (2) "the Eiffel Tower is in Paris," or (3) "all bachelors are men."

What troubles me about this claim is that we have a perfectly good understanding of what makes (2) & (3) true, but it's impossible to see how (1) could be true in the same ways. Clearly (1) isn't an empirical claim about the world, nor can its truth be verified by merely reflecting on the meaning of the words used to express it. In what sense then can an ethical proposition be objectively true?

Answer 1

The way the question is worded makes me hesitate to believe the OP is interested in the answer, but I'll give it a go. I'll answer this by specifying the parameters necessary to make assertions like (1).

First, I'd assume that people who believe we can state moral propositions are going to be moral realists. This means they believe that morality (or at least some part of it ) is real, meaning non-arbitrary.

In other words, they are going to be committed to the idea that moral rules are not merely rules produced by society or by optimizing for pleasure. (Though the latter may have a propositional commitment to the claim that "pleasure is the standard of right and wrong" which might then commit them to other propositions).

Second, they would need to believe moral realities can be captured and assessed propositionally. Not all moral realists are committed to the idea that moral realities are best captured propositionally.

Stated at their core, to use moral propositions, you must:

1. be a moral realist (or meta-realist).
2. have a moral epistemology where the goodness or badness of claims can be evaluated as true or false.

This is a big topic for philosophy in the 19th and 20th centuries. A.J. Ayer for instance asserted that moral propositions are meaningless. Other names that are important for debate are Moore, W.D. Ross, and Elizabeth Anscombe especially "Modern Moral Philosophy."

Anscombe's work is extremely on point to your question and looks at it from the angle of language usage, arguing that "to be a bilker" is precisely to engage dishonestly with a shopkeeper and that by definition bilking is not morally neutral but wrong.

Answer 2

Just look at a judicial code. It sets out what is wrong as being illegal. It is defined, objectively. Problem solved?

Answer 3

I understand that your asking: how can we prove the truth of (1), and since we cannot prove the truth of this proposition then it obviously cannot be true.

I think the answer to your question may be the theory of intuitionism. According to intuitionism moral propositions are self-evident and unnecessary of proof, we simply know that certain acts are morally wrong and attempts to prove them or justify them will not be fruitful. That is not to say that arguments of some sort cannot convince us of its truth, only that they need no proof. In fact this has been Prichard's (20th century intuitionist) main criticism on moral philosophy which according to him rests on a mistake. The mistake is that the philosophers are searching proofs for self-evident propositions. He states that there is no proposition which will justify propositions like "harming others is wrong" in some way stronger than it justifies itself. And i think that he is absolutely right in saying that.

Consider for example the moral proposition "pleasure is good". It is self-evident and we all know that it is true. But can we prove it? Obviously self-evident propositions do not need to be proven, we apprehend its truth and no proof need to be provided. Intuitionism asserts that we all know that "theft is wrong", the fact that some would disagree with this does not prove that we do not posses intuitive moral knowledge just like not everyone would agree with the obvious mathematical proposition: 1/4 + 1/2 = 3/4. The fact that there is mathematical disagreement does not lead us to say that there are no objectively true mathematical propositions, and neither should we conclude that there are no objectively true moral propositions based on "moral disagreement". There are other factors that may explain why moral disagreement arise, like human error, miscalculations, confusion, hasty judgement, false and incomplete information.

And lastly the argument is self refuting, as Huemer puts it, "if the argument from disagreement is sound, then it refutes itself, since many people do not agree with the argument from disagreement" (2005: 146).

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The material has been taken from intuitionism, David Kaspar, bloomsbury ethics, 2012.

Answer 4

Can an ethical proposition be objectively true, empirically? I am persuaded no. An ethical proposition is a statement of meaning, and a meaning without objective reference. Our meanings arise mentally. There are those Intuitionists who say there is an inner sense of right and wrong. But there are indications that this stand is very fragile. Human beings frequently show themselves very manipulable by group thinking and pressures, most obvious in such things as civilized Germany's descent into barbarism under totalitarian pressure and propaganda. Important experiments like the Stanford experiment, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanford_prison_experiment have shown further evidence of this human trait. Very quickly, under group pressure and persuasion, so-called deep sourced ethical meanings are dislodged. There are some brave and heroic (cf: Dietrich Boenhoffer) that stand with great decision and character against and hold out even to death But it is not the rule.

The ideas of Emotivism would seem to fit here also: "Motivism is a meta-ethical view that claims that ethical sentences do not express propositions but emotional attitudes. Hence, it is colloquially known as the hurrah/boo theory." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emotivism

Stoic philosophy is built on the belief we can by choice and practice choose our ethical actions, and finally I am persuaded that this is what happens. There is no "moral reference stream" out there or in us but only our rational decisive faculty. An ethical position is taken in much the same way as we choose this car or that to drive around in. Of course, consequentially, the type and state of the car will determine our ride and those that ride with us. To stop everyone riding around in lemons, and ploughing into everyone else, we need laws which are a communal social choice by way of government. Consequentialism fits nicely with this understanding of ethical decision making.

"Before the sacred, people lost all sense of power and all confidence; they occupy a powerless and humble attitude toward it. And yet no thing is sacred of itself, but by declaring it sacred, by my declaration, my judgment, my bending the knee; in short, by my - conscience." - Max Stirner

For me the 'conscience' of Mr Stirner is an inculcated social conditioning or alternatively our own, owned and developed one.