The SEP has explanations. You should probably read the whole article. Section 6 is the most important for this I suppose. If you're looking for some literature, the introduction of Ravenscroft is good. So it's for example easier to understand than the SEP article here I believe.
Are type- identity and token- identity compatible? Why?
Yes. Type identity implies token identity. But token identity doesn't imply type identity.
The key idea behind token identity is that for every particular there is a physical particular. So for everything mental there is something physical. How they are related isn't said here. Whenever something mental is going on, something physical is also going on.
The key idea behind type identity is that for every type of mental property there's one identical type of physical property. Where exactly is the difference? A popular notion used against type identity is that of multiple realization. Take for example "pain" as a mental property. Type identity means that there's some physical property that is identical to pain. But if it's identical then this means that "pain" can only happen in one specific way. But "pain" could maybe also happen with slightly different brains. Or maybe it could even happen with a brain that is radically different or that isn't even organic. If multiple realizability is true then type identity is in trouble. Whether slightly different brains already count as multiple realizability sort of depends on which exact view you hold.
Are substance dualism and identity theory compatible? Why?
Are property dualism and token- identity compatible?
The short answer is that token identity allows for either property dualism or supervenience physicalism. Without supervenience physicalism there's no type identity.