Are substance dualism and identity theory compatible? Why?

Are property dualism and token- identity compatible? Why?

Are type- identity and token- identity compatible? Why?

If someone could help me, I would really appreciate it. I'm lost and my professor isn't very helpful.

  • @community: you've got a diamond mod marker next to your name. Are you a mod? What is your moderation policy? Can we have some transparency about this? – Mozibur Ullah Apr 29 '18 at 22:41
  • @Mozibur Ullah Go to the meta page for all that. The tag above just means it's been bumped to the list of articles from all different stack exchanges, that gets shown in the side bar sometimes. Often when that happens, you get a lot more people clicking and the views jump up v high – CriglCragl May 1 '18 at 1:57

The SEP has explanations. You should probably read the whole article. Section 6 is the most important for this I suppose. If you're looking for some literature, the introduction of Ravenscroft is good. So it's for example easier to understand than the SEP article here I believe.

Are type- identity and token- identity compatible? Why?

Yes. Type identity implies token identity. But token identity doesn't imply type identity.

The key idea behind token identity is that for every particular there is a physical particular. So for everything mental there is something physical. How they are related isn't said here. Whenever something mental is going on, something physical is also going on.

The key idea behind type identity is that for every type of mental property there's one identical type of physical property. Where exactly is the difference? A popular notion used against type identity is that of multiple realization. Take for example "pain" as a mental property. Type identity means that there's some physical property that is identical to pain. But if it's identical then this means that "pain" can only happen in one specific way. But "pain" could maybe also happen with slightly different brains. Or maybe it could even happen with a brain that is radically different or that isn't even organic. If multiple realizability is true then type identity is in trouble. Whether slightly different brains already count as multiple realizability sort of depends on which exact view you hold.

Are substance dualism and identity theory compatible? Why?


Are property dualism and token- identity compatible?

The short answer is that token identity allows for either property dualism or supervenience physicalism. Without supervenience physicalism there's no type identity.

edit: typo

| improve this answer | |

Your Answer

By clicking “Post Your Answer”, you agree to our terms of service, privacy policy and cookie policy

Not the answer you're looking for? Browse other questions tagged or ask your own question.