It seems like most philosophers have moved away from physicalist and/or reductive materialist position on the mind-body problem? Can somebody explain why? I really don't have any arguments in favour of complete physicalist view of the world (which is what I hold) except that it seems more simple, beautiful and elegant if the world is only physical and all mental states have in fact physical counterparts. But I think the dualist position is also difficult to argue. So why are most philosophers moving away from such a physicalist interpretation?
It seems like most philosophers have moved away from physicalist and/or reductive materialist position on the mind-body problem? Can somebody explain why?
Where do you get that idea? It seems as though most are physicalists.
But I think the dualist position is also difficult to argue. So why are most philosophers moving away from such a physicalist interpretation?
Let's see. Firstly, substance dualism isn't the only opponent of physicalism. There's also property dualism for example. I believe there's disagreement on whether or not that is still physicalist. We could for example think of property dualism as a kind of token physicalism. If we think it makes sense to put token physicalism under the label "physicalism" then we can both (at least some kinds of) property dualism under "physicalism". But some believe that "physicalism" usually means at least supervenience. Token physicalism doesn't imply supervenience, however.
Hence, secondly, it sort of depends on what exactly you consider to be "physicalism". Is it reductive? Does it mainly come from views on supervenience or from identity?
This can also be broadened. One direction of criticism comes from the idea that "physicality" is poorly understood and make be trivial, vague, etc. Here's a paragraph about it.
Generally though, proponents of something other than physicalism - whatever that means - like to put an emphasis on the mental. How could phenomenality possibly arise out of something physical? One way of looking like this issue is this: while a physicalist might think there's a epistemic gap here, they'll have to think that ontologically there's no issue. This means that a physicalist could posit that we have no idea how exactly emergence works but going by certain other ideas - supervenience etc. - that we'd have no reason to think it's not physical in some sense (supervenient f.e.). Meanwhile a non-physicalist would argue that there's an ontological gap. They will focus on ideas like qualia or p-zombies in order to argue for that gap. Non-physicalists think there's a hard problem - as in special problem - of consciousness while physicalists could think the problem is just a difficult normal problem.
I'd argue it's poorly understood how exactly we ought to even think about that problem. Chalmers has written a paper about "The Meta-Problem of Consciousness". I've only superficially glanced at it. But I believe the underlying motivation that "... the meta-problem is a potentially tractable research project for everyone." is spot on.
There are also some approaches coming from philosophy of language and some other issues. More here.