For this question I'm just considering Wittgenstein's theory at the time of the Tractatus. As far as I know, for Wittgenstein:
Meaning - The object denoted by a word (i.e. referent).
Sense - The conditions under which a sentence can be verified or falsified. (Adherence to the principle of bipolarity).
Hence tautologies and contradictions are senseless due to their not having conditions under which they can be verified or falsified. However he maintains that they are not nonsense,
4.461 '... tautologies and contradictions lack sense...'
4.4611 'Tautologies and contradictions are not, however, non-sensical.'
Continuing from this,
6.54 '...anyone who understands me eventually recognizes [my propositions] as nonsensical...'
- Am I correct in thinking that Wittgenstein only afforded the property of senselessness (i.e. not nonsense) to tautologies and contradictions?
- What is this distinction between senselessness vs nonsense actually based on?
- Furthermore, how can nonsense still manage to communicate something to us, as appears Wittgenstein intended it does via the propositions in the Tractatus? (How can things be shown and what can be shown?)
Any help, ideas or recommendations for reading would be greatly appreciated!