Are systems that lack this rule considered as having failed?
Not necessarily. It depends on what you take to be the most important aspects of a system.
Are there any Philosophers who consider completeness, or a lack of completeness as a virtue of a system?
Yes. Some philosophers give pride of place to deductive power. Here I've got someone maybe from the Dummettian inferentialist tradition in mind. By their lights, what logic is for is formalizing arguments (at first-order). Given this goal, semantic incompleteness is undesirable, because it means that some entailments cannot be captured by your proof system. These philosophers will regard a failure of semantic completeness as problematic (as in the case of second-order logic, as Mauro points out), because their project requires a tight connection between logical entailment and deductive validity.
Other philosophers, however, give pride of place to expressive power. Mathematical structuralists are an example here. By these philosopher's lights, what matters is that we pin down structures - of the natural numbers, say. Since you can only do that at second-order, you have to give up semantic completeness to do it. These philosophers won't regard second-order logic as having 'failed', even though it's semantically incomplete, because it does precisely what they want it to: precisely characterize structures.