Grounds for morality in subjective idealistic reality?

Question

In objective reality we are all sharing the same physical world, thus our actions affect other real beings, laying some grounds for morality, at the very least the "do onto others" and its invert.

But if reality is subjective, and purely a construct of a central to it consciousness with no common objective physical manifestation, that appears to render morality obsolete.

For example, in the context of murder:

• if I am central and define this reality, then murder will be a crime against a figment of my imagination, and therefore will not matter

• if I am a product of someone else's reality, I am just a figment of that consciousness' imagination, therefore I don't have control over my actions and bear no responsibility for murdering anyone, including the central person

• solipsism or not, even if "the extras" are real people, my actions will only affect them in my reality, and not in theirs, so no violation against another consciousness takes place, and a violation against someone else can only take place if they themselves manifest it in their subjective reality

So how and why would one have morality in a subjective reality?

Answer 1

Morality is perfectly possible in a 'subjective idealistic reality' if subjective idealism is the view that all that exists is the - a single - knowing or experiencing subject. Morality is commonly taken to be interpersonal but it can be and is intrapersonal as well. If I exist as the only knowing or experiencing subject, I can still have duties to myself - Kant's Pflicht genen sich (selbst).

Not that the point depends on Kant who in any case was not a subjective idealist. But I could as the only knowing or experiencing subject recognise a duty not to deceive myself about my own states of mind or emotions and in general acknowledge a duty, a self-imposed one, to maximise my capacities for self-knowledge - a duty of self-improvement.

In brief, whenever there is on the common understanding of morality a duty to oneself, one could still have that duty as the only knowing or experiencing subject.

Against the objection that the notion of 'duties to oneself' does not make sense, all the above claims can be re-stated in the language of moral self-improvement.

Again, someone might argue that to think in moral terms one needs a public language, which a sole knowing or experiencing subject could not have. But insofar as this resonse depends on Wittgenstein's anti-private language argument the objection is only as strong or as weak as that less than decisive if ingenious argument.

Someone again might argue that self-consciousness, which my argument assumes, depends on interpersonal experience. Self needs non-self or other self for the idea of one's own self to be possible. But this is no decisive objection : the 'Self needs non-self or other self' argument is precisely that - an argument to be assessed, not a philosophical datum.

Answer 2

Consequences don't have to be objectively based in order to matter. To pretend you are forgiven because some objective criterion is met, including the objective lack of objective judgement, is inauthentic in the Existentialist sense. They same way the refusal to act is a course of action, the refusal to be moral is a moral position, and the consequences for the holder of such a position are still very real.

Subjectivity does not eliminate psychology. Murder is hard on people -- both the people around the victim and the murderer. You can disclaim this, but you cannot escape it. Child soldiers who are raised into an addiction to killing still suffer PTSD. Psychopaths who do not appear to have guilt still suffer psychologically from others' disdain. None of us are truly amoral, when we accept our own reactions. Whether that morality comes back at us from inside or outside our personality, it does come back.

Whatever subjective force has shaped our reactions, those reactions are still real. If the world is yours, you are free to create suffering for yourself, but it is still not wise.

Answer 3

I think it's clear that there is a strong how and why NOT to have morality given solipsism or one of the other kinds of subjective reality. In fact, it seems a strong thesis that believing in this kind of reality is a rational basis for denying morality.

On the flip side, since such subjective realities support such non-moral action, it seems that any strong beliefs about morality would support belief in objective reality, that is, the objective existence of other persons like ourselves. If you think morality is important, then it is difficult to justify solipsism.

Answer 4

In subjective idealistic reality, morality may exist. One of the classical ways in which morality may be understood in a subjective reality is based on doctrine of ignorance and illusion (refer Advaita Vedanta). All actions that are reaffirmation of illusion and ignorance are immoral and all actions that are taken in light of knowledge may be classified as moral.

Because actions like murder are based primarily on assumption of duality of the observer and the observed,they will still be immoral. For e.g., the motivation for murder may be hate which may result from a feeling of being cheated upon by another person. However, if either the cheater or the cheated is a figment of imagination, then murdering someone based on that is reaffirmation of illusion and falsity.

Note - In Advaita Vedanta, morality, at the highest level of reality is assumed to be illusion. However, it can be argued to exist based on the above mentioned criterion.