I'm looking for arguments against the idea that you can have a priori knowledge of a priori knowledge. Perhaps appealing to an internalist account of knowledge and claiming that the justification for the claim 'I know X a priori' is not accessible to us?

Any help much appreciated

  • Wouldn't any argument against a priori knowledge be automatically what you want? And if there is a priori knowldge but we are not able to know that a priori there is not much point to it, is there?
    – Conifold
    May 3, 2018 at 21:33
  • It is not possible. The Private Language argument is quite sufficient to show this.
    – CriglCragl
    Mar 15, 2021 at 17:52

1 Answer 1


I'm not exactly sure why the proposition 'I know X a priori' would not be accessible to yourself.

  1. I know X a priori (by proving it without relying on empirical data).
  2. Then I know that 'I know X a priori' without relying on empirical data

I would say that the transition from 1 to 2 is a matter of being aware that you know X a priori. Once you know something, you know that you know it without having to perform experiments (a priori). You could go on ad infinitum.

  • 1
    There are models (you could call them) where knowledge of one's own mental states counts as empirical, or at least passive (I do think apriority maps to proactivity and experience to passivity). I think Kant argues this way when dealing with the paralogism... Mar 15, 2021 at 15:40

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