The Justified, True Belief account of knowledge is problematic and none of the solutions proposed seems to solve all possible Gettier problems (at least, that's what I have come to believe).

Do we need truth in an account of knowledge? Can it be merely defined as rational belief or justified belief?

I say this, because access to truth seems very puzzling. How should I "know" I have reached truth? Even science posit falsifiability as his main criteria, which means we do not really know something; we just have some kind of belief about how things really are, justified by the lack of evidence to the contrary.

Does epistemology have to concern itself with justified belief rather than with justified true belief? Is the truth condition chimerical?

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    Removing "truth" from the analysis of knowledge is also more natural from the historical perspective, that we now know "better" seems rather moot to what Aristotle's or Archimedes's circumstances. However, one of the semantic functions of "know" seems to be to privilege today's view. A systematic proposal for doing it without identifying it with truth, or "mostly" truth is called "pragmatic encroachment", it is briefly described in the linked SEP article. But it goes against the usual linguistic intuitions that JTB attempts to capture. – Conifold Jun 14 '18 at 18:19
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    Also, the intuition that knowledge requires truth is pretty solid. “Jack knows that Jill is pregnant, but she isn’t” & “Jack falsely knows that Jill is pregnant” are very difficult to understand. Cf “Jack believes (with justification) that Jill is pregnant, but she isn’t” & “Jack falsely (but justifiedly) believes that Jill is pregnant”. Also, if there are any factive propositional attitudes, they plausibly imply knowledge: if Jack regrets p, we’d say that he knows p. If Jack only justifiedly believes p, or hopes it, he may not know. So, it looks like knowledge belongs in the factive camp. – MarkOxford Jun 15 '18 at 19:47
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    The usual ways: thinking and looking (aka a priori and a posteriori, aka armchair and empirical investigation). To add two pre-emptive remarks: (1) If you think that truth is inaccessible (whatever that means), what are your beliefs and belief-forming processes aimed at? If fact, what do you believe when believing that p – if it’s not that p is true? How do you act on your belief that p – if it’s not acting as though p was true? (2) Even the Sceptic grants that our beliefs are true (that there is such a thing as true belief). She only denies that any of our (true) beliefs are knowledge. – MarkOxford Jun 16 '18 at 9:48
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    @MarkOxford I guess I am not clear on what "p's truth" means. A skeptic, in principle, does not claim anything: grass appears green, sure, but who knows. If we can never know whether any particular p is true in any robust sense, as in "correspondence to reality" in some way, there is no point to using it, for defining knowledge or otherwise. Then there are of course anti-realists, who argue that the "correspondence" is, on reflection, unintelligible to begin with. So if knowing p entails its truth then either it takes God to know anything, or the "truth" of JTB is something very deflated. – Conifold Jun 18 '18 at 17:53
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    @Conifold I feel that there are too many moving parts here. If you/the sceptic think that knowing p doesn’t entail p, aren’t you just talking past pretty much everyone in contemporary analytic philosophy? (If you’re making a point about ancient or non-analytic scepticism, I’m afraid I don’t know anything about that.) Also, if p being true isn’t a necessary condition on knowing p, what are the necessary conditions? Claiming that we don’t know p means there’s a necessary condition on knowing p that we don’t meet. So, the sceptic must name at least one necessary condition on knowing p. – MarkOxford Jun 18 '18 at 18:32

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