First, we are not descended from monkeys, and second, you give a tell in saying "we're just another species" (paraphrased). We are animals, yes ... and? The fact is, all animals have a stake in getting things right.
For us, it's not only a matter of life and death as it is for other animals, but also, it's about quality of life.
There are three absolute truths and they are all trivial: axioms, tautology, truism. These have nothing to do with explaining how reality is. All other things we call "true" and mean "is the case" are done so through deliberation.
We don't need theories of truth or ideas about whether or not "it" exists or if it's mind-independent or a property of kinds of sentences. For example, to say some proposition "corresponds to" or is "coherent with" or "adheres" or again, "is mind-independent" and so on, is to make a claim, a completely new proposition related to the one being asserted. Both are settled entirely by providing objective justification that should lead any generally rational person to such a conclusion. Any talk of truth then is simply a discussion about justification and our ability to assert. There's no need to think of this justificatory practice as needing any other set of propositions for it; such as "P corresponds", for instance.
Simply: P, because it's the most justifiable thing to think.
Hope that helps.
There is no property of truth intrinsic to the explanation, but only a vast array of explanatory stories of the identical form, none of which need use the predicate (Truth) and none of which, therefore, requires the identification of any mysterious property or relation to which the predicate might supposed to refer.
(Pederson & Wright, ‘Truth And Pluralism: Current Debates’, pg. 264)
Let us now return to our biconditional (T): the assertion that p is true if and only if (really) p. The intuition that this sentence expresses could also be reformulated as such: an assertion is true if and only if it is the case as was asserted. We can now think what 'place' such an explanation of the concept of truth can have in our practice of making assertions. This practice is of a 'normative' kind: assertions are moves in a language game that are "justified" or "unjustified". We are entitled to assertions if we have good reasons to assert that p, or if we have convinced ourselves through our perception that p -- or also if someone whom we have good reason to trust has said to us that p (i.e., reason for the assumption that this Someone could provide good reasons). What we learn when we learn a language is -- among other things -- to judge in a reasoned way and to distinguish between justified and unjustified assertions (convictions). This suggests a new interpretation of the biconditional (T), which no longer frames it as an attempt to interpret truth as an agreement between statements and states of affairs, but rather as an attempt to determine the place the word "true" has in our assertive and justificatory praxis. Accordingly, we could now read the biconditional as such: someone is justified in asserting that p is true precisely when he or she is justified in asserting that p. And this could now be further interpreted as saying: to say that an assertion is true is nothing other than to say that the assertion is legitimate (grounded, justified). Truth would then become no more than "warranted assertability" or "rational acceptability." The concept of truth would consequently be drawn back into justification.
(Albrecht Wellmer, ‘The Pragmatic Turn In Philosophy: Contemporary Engagements Between Analytic And Continental Thought’, State University Of New York, 2004, Page 96)