Abstract right emerges and is recognised as rationally necessary at a certain stage in the historical development of Spirit. It is broadly the right of an individual to determine their own conduct (any individual and not just a member of a class or group), to heed one's own conscience, to act on one's own inclinations and intentions, to own property and to enter into contractual relations with others.
Recognition of abstract right as rationally necessary is a discovery. The realisation that it is appropriate to the nature of human beings is a fact that is apprehended and comprehended only at a certain stage in the historical development of Spirit.
Abstract right and human rights
While it is possible to identify abstract right with human rights of a kind, Hegel would never, I think, subscribe to anything like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This is because he regards abstract right as indeterminate and as needing concrete embodiment in distinct historical communities with their own understanding and expression through custom, law and practice of how human beings should live together. We need membership of such historically specific communities, not the possession of universal human rights that are context-free of any specific community.
At the most general level, human rights law is informed by the aim of
establishing practical arrangements in which the interests of all those
touched by its operations are adequately accommodated. This is the same
aim as finds expression in Hegel's ideal of abstract right. This being so,
human rights law, like abstract right, is underdeterminate and, as such, open
to a range of plausible interpretations. Hence, the question arises (in
particular contexts) as to how to pursue the aim common to both human
rights law and abstract right. When faced with the question 'How should
abstract right be pursued?', Hegel turns to actually-existing ethical
community (Sittlichkeit) as a source of guidance. He identifies Sittlichkeit
as giving expression to (imperfect) local understandings of justice. These
understandings find their most vivid form of expression in political
community (a component of the wider category of Sittlichkeit). Political
community is instantiated by the state, its laws and other institutions and
practices that bespeak commitment to the right (just social ordering) and
some conception of the good (valuable ends, worthy of pursuit) institutions and practices, Hegel finds clues as to how the requirements of
abstract right can be met (or, at least, approximated) in the relevant context.
Hegel views the relationship between abstract right and local understandings as one of productive interdependence. Abstract right speaks (as a
higher-order norm) to the deficiencies of actually-existing institutions (for
example, a tendency to privilege some interests and to marginalize others).
And actually-existing institutions and practices (such as those that give shape
to a distinct political community) speak in concrete (and sometimes ethically
attractive) terms to a particular context in which abstract right must be
pursued. This view of the relationship between Sittlichkeit and abstract
right is readily applicable to actually-existing frameworks of human rights
law and their general aim (as described above). Human rights law is
informed by the aim of giving concrete shape to an underdeterminate ideal.
Given the underdeterminacy of this ideal, the shape the law assumes can
vary. And the relevant variations can be expected to reflect the context (most
obviously, a distinct political community) in which the relevant body of law
is established. (Richard Mullender, 'Hegel, Human Rights, and Particularism', Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Dec., 2003), pp. 554-574 : 562-3.)