Kuhn developed his 'no algorithm' argument [for theory choice : GT] most thoroughly in a
1977 essay entitled 'Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice'.
In that essay, he identifies five criteria that provide 'the shared basis
for theory choice', namely accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity,
and fruitfulness (Kuhn 1977a, p. 321). These five, he says, are 'the
standard criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a theory', widely
agreed on by mainstream philosophers of science. Kuhn has no quar
rel with the standard view that these criteria play a key role in scientific
theory choice; indeed, he regards them as partially constitutive of what
science is. However, he argues, using examples from the history of
science, that the criteria fail to uniquely determine theory choice, for
two reasons. Firstly, the criteria are ambiguous — it may be unclear
which of two theories is simpler, for example. In some respects
Copernicus' theory was simpler than Ptolemy's, Kuhn says, but in
others it was not. Secondly, there is the problem of how to appropri
ately weight the criteria when they pull in different directions. How
should simplicity be traded off against accuracy and scope, for ex
ample? Kuhn says that 'no progress' has been made towards solving
this problem (Kuhn 1977, 329). (Samir Okasha, 'Theory Choice and Social Choice: Kuhn versus Arrow', Mind, Vol. 120, No. 477 (January 2011), pp. 83-115 : 85.)
It's vital to add that Kuhn has reservations about these criteria : (1) of two theories, one may be simpler than the other in some respects but not in others; and (2) the criteria do not necessarily converge. One theory can score high on one criterion, another high on a different criterion. There is no lexical ordering of criteria by which we can assign greater weight to one criterion rather than another.
Thomas Kuhn, 'Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice', The Essential Tension. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977, 320-39.