perceptual/observational—observational evidence cannot provide a common basis for theory comparison, since perceptual experience is theory-dependent

Kuhn expresses or builds on the idea that participants in different disciplinary matrices will see the world differently by claiming that their worlds are different

(source: Staford Ecyclopedia of Phylosophy on Thomas Kuhn, Ch. "4.2 Perception, Observational Incommensurability, and World-Change")

For observational incommensurability depends on working into different disciplinary matrices and seeing world differently, and consequently on practicing in different worlds, are we legitimate to argue that perceptual / observational incommensurability is an ontological incommensurability as well?

Or what is the connection between the two (observational and ontological incommensurability)?

  • 1
    Isn't "ontological incommensurability" meaningless if one admits epistemological one? If the observations are so matrix dependent that there is no invariant substrate underneath it is not even clear that every matrix includes some analog of "ontology". Quine already remarked in On What There Is that the notion of "being" might be too parochial to be universally shared, and specifically restricted the talk of ontological commitments to languages "commensurable" with ours (for him, paraphrasable into predicate calculus).
    – Conifold
    Jul 24 '18 at 20:11

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