Whereas philosophy was once closely associated with nature this is less so in the modern era; for example, Newton thought of himself as a natural philosopher and not as a mathematician or physicist though these are the names we retrospectively use to describe him.
This break was occurred in the early part of the 20C. It was quite common then for scientists to be versed in philosophy - for example Heisenberg read Plato and considered the elementall nature of the world to be akin to fire (ie energy) - whereas in the modern era this is very much less so and increasingly so; Feynman in his popular books, for example, ridicules philosophy whilst at least having the grace to attempt to understand it; and Sabine Hossenfelder in her popular book ridicules philosophy without showing any evidence that she has read any philosophy of worth.
It's plausible that this this is merely an artifact of the increasing specialisation of the various disciplines. Even in a discipline traditionally closely associated with physics - that is mathematics - the prominent British mathematician, Sir Michael Atiyah pointed out that mathematics increasingly had different questions that it pursued apart from physics; nevertheless, he noted that on occasion - and he points out the 70s - the two disciples cross-fertilised each other (in his example, the theory of fibre bundles and QFTs) and then again in the 90s, with the advent of string theory. Likewise we might posit an eventual reconciliation between philosophy and physics - on occasion and perhaps more permanently.
Metaphysics, as considered by Aristotle, was prominently concerned with the nature of the physical world; so he posited difficult questions about space, time, change and continuity; he also theorised about a first mover, which was later identified by the Islamic and Christian philosophers with God and it's this which tends to more prominent when people hear the word, metaphysics.
Space and time are naturally considered as determinate - we can measure the metre and we can measure the second - but in early physical theories, space and time emerged from an indeterminate something; in the classical period, this determinateness was taken as the background stage in which physics actually occurred - the absolute space and time of Newton; this determinate sense was retained even in Einsteins revolutionary theory of space, time and energy. However, QM has forced us to look at again at these concepts and recognise a quality of indeterminateness. This returns us to earlier physical speculations about the place of the indeterminate in physical theory. One might posit that if the fundamental reality is indeterminate then in its determinate unfolding we should still see some aspect of this indeterminateness in our everyday experience of determinateness.
In the modern speculative theories of QG such as Loop Quantum Gravity (LQG) and String Theory it's generally expected that space and time, in the usual sense, are emergent concepts.
For example, in LQG, the spectra of an area operator gives the basic quanta of area. The same does not hold for string theory - as there the background is still a given - so in some ways, LQG is more revolutionary than string theory where space and time remain a background stage and are not reworked conceptually.
Hence in the LQG context, we have a non-spatial fundamental reality (but which does not negate spatial reality) since spatiality is implicit and emerges in its unfolding.