Does functionalism of the mind allow for free will?

Question

Functionalism views the mental processes in terms of causes and effects (ex. inputs such as sensory stimuli and output such as moving an extremity).

But how would free will fit into this theory if at all?

One would imagine that he has at least some control over his thoughts. If a person would like to think about ice cream, for example, then he would be able to by the power of his free will. Wouldn't the decision of thinking about ice cream be a mental process itself?

If it is, then the output is obvious, but there must be some input that caused the output. If the output (thinking about ice cream) is really dependent on some input, then how could free will exist?

What I mean is this: It seems that any array of possible actions performed via the power of free must be at least somewhat restricted by some input(s). Environmental factors influence our behavior, such as seeing a family member or intoxication. So, some input(s) should restrict the possible actions one can choose to do, but there is always some range of outputs that can be chosen from if there really is free will. It is important that:

• There are multiple outputs that can be chosen from (if there was only one then these input(s) would not allow for free will).
• An agent of free will can choose which of these outputs to "pick."

The action of "picking" (like "picking" to think about ice cream) seems to be a mental process as well, however. It must also be viewed in terms of input(s)/output(s) in the view of functionalism. So, in the action of "picking," what would be the input that causes one to "pick"? And if there really was this sort of input and output, then how could "picking" be an action of free will?

Let's say that there are some input(s) that similarly restrict what one can "pick," but not completely so free will can be allowed for. Even if this is the case, how can "picking" the available outputs be explained in terms of functionalism? It seems that the process of "picking" some available outputs would still require an input until there is only one available output.

It consequently seems that functionalism does not allow for free will. Am I wrong or correct?

Source of my views on functionalism: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy's Article on Functionalism

Answer 1

I think that we "get in trouble" when we think that some of these theories are "mutually exclusive" instead of thinking one is good at explaining a portion of our selves and another is good at explaining some other portion. Together, they can explain more than each individually! Let me give an actual example:

It was a hot evening and as I was watching TV, I was getting thirsty. I starter thinking about getting up, going to the refrigerator, and pouring myself some cold tea. However, before I got up, I remembered that there was ice cream in the freezer, so when I got to the refrigerator, I got ice cream instead.

This example shows that for this action, there was not only a "cause & effect," but also "free will" got involved.

Using the analogy of a plane, functionalism would be the auto-pilot, and free will, the human pilot. Just like the human pilot decides to engage or disengage the auto-pilot, free will also decides when to allow functionalism to take, or not, control of a given situation/action.

Answer 2

I agree with functionalism and I agree with free will. The way that I rationalize this is with the analogy to quantum mechanics. You can measure the speed of a particle with precision, but not its position. You can also measure position with high precision, but not if you are measuring its velocity. With the mind you can break open the skull and look at every nerve ending to establish the cause of all stimulation, but you will not see free will. It's only when the brain is isolated from observation like a black box does free will emerge due to the concerted reactions of many many complex reactions that we cannot predict from stimuli and reaction alone.

Answer 3

Does functionalism of the mind allow for free will?

• Guill said, "However, before I got up, I remembered that there was ice cream in the freezer, so when I got to the refrigerator, I got ice cream instead."

It is probably the memory function of the mind that actually allows the capacity for free will, because it provides the basis for decision making. People with faulty or weak recall tend to make poor decisions and have great difficulty learning from mistakes. Free will is a survival mechanism.

Answer 4

Does functionalism of the mind allow for free will?

Functionalism is the view that the mind is the function that a physical realizer plays.

A physical realizer can be a human brain, computer chip, Martian organ. But in the case of functionalism, they all perform the same task, they take input and provide output.

Machine functionalism is a special type of functionalism which views the mind as a Turing machine.

A Turing machine is symbol manipulator machine, which takes input, writes (or erases)it as symbols on a memory tape, and all of this happens according to a set of instruction called the machine table. The machine table breaks down a complex problem into small tasks, and these small tasks or states are called machine states.

Machine states are seen as mental states in machine functionalism.

But here is the problem. In Machine functionalism, the inputs are sensory inputs, and outputs are motor outputs.

And on this view, the brain is not literally the Turing machine, it is the functional mechanism that is the Turing machine.

But what is the ontological relationship between the physical realizer and Turing machine?

Surely, Physical Realizer takes input and provides the output, but the Turing machine does the computation the result of which is mental states.

But what does it compute?

Theories of representation argue that the sensory inputs are codified into representational contents. But representational contents have semantic properties and syntactic properties. But the Turing machine can only manipulate syntactic properties of the symbol.

Then, functionalism cannot explain how semantic properties of content are manipulated.

Now functionalism claims that mental state can cause other mental state or physical actions. In other words, it is causally efficacious.

But this claim seems to be false, because if semantic properties of symbols are not manipulated, then the Turing machine cannot provide intentional outcomes. And if it cannot provide intentional outcomes, then it cannot causally affect the physical world.

Thus the idea is that if the core premises of functionalism are true then the mind takes input and computes them but it cannot really provide an output, since providing output requires semantic manipulation of representational content.

The result of the computation is various mental states but the output is null. In other words, it leads to epiphenomenalism. Epiphenomenalists argue that the physical world is causally closed and that the mental states are an epiphenomenon of various physiological activities. In that sense, functionalism implies that we do not have free will.

Illustration:

Let us say you feel pain when I pinch you. The input is pinching, and the function is feeling pain. The output is wincing, but this has nothing to do with your feeling pain, it is just your body physical body reacting to physical stimuli, that is pinching. Then according to functionalism, we do not have free will.

Obviously there is something wrong with functionalism, and it can be illustrated in myriad other ways.

For Further Reading:

Block, N. (1989) “Can the mind change the world?” In Boolos, G.S. (ed.) Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam. Cambridge University Press. pp. 137--170.

Fodor, J.A. (1974) Special sciences (or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis). Synthese, 28 (2): 97–115.

Kim, J. (1992) Multiple realization and the metaphysics of reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52 (1): 1–26.

Kim, J. (1998) Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation. MIT Press.

Kim, J. (2011) Philosophy of mind [electronic resource] / Jaegwon Kim. 3rd ed. Boulder, CO: Boulder, CO : Westview Press.

Lewis, D. (1970) An argument for the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy, 63 (2): 17–25.

Answer 5

Freewill is a monumentally huge topic, which does not have one clean definition which is sufficient to answer your questions. You have to choose definition to move forward.

One definition I find very useful is to define freewill as an action which occurred at least in part because of the internal state of the entity which is not known outside of the entity. This sort of black box (or even grey box) definition provides a natural way for freewill and functionalism to coexist until you start considering omniscient entities -- but freewill gets murky there anyways.

The usual counter is that you aren't "free" because you can only do what your state tells you to. And that's reasonable, for some definitions of freewill. Then the question becomes "do you have the freewill to do what you wont do?" And it becomes a fun discussion.