As I understand, a priori statements are propositions that are conceived independently of one's experience.
However, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy states that
The sensible world, or the world of appearances, is constructed by the human mind from a combination of sensory matter that we receive passively and a priori forms that are supplied by our cognitive faculties. We can have a priori knowledge only about aspects of the sensible world that reflect the a priori forms supplied by our cognitive faculties. In Kant’s words, “we can cognize of things a priori only what we ourselves have put into them” (Bxviii). So according to the Critique, a priori knowledge is possible only if and to the extent that the sensible world itself depends on the way the human mind structures its experience.
I gather from this that our mind and our experience work jointly to know the world. As an example, our mind might provide us with two priori propositions:
1) Our world is necessarily causal. 2) Our world isn't necessarily causal.
Drawing from our experience, we will conclude that the proposition 1 is the priori that describes our world. (Edit) Hence in such a manner, our mental cognition works together with our experience to know the intelligible world.
Is this inference from the passage accurate?