In Colin McGinn's "The Mysterious Flame," McGinn argues against the materialistic response to the hard problem of consciousness with the following argument:
Suppose I know everything about your brain of a neural kind: I know its anatomy, its chemical ingredients, the pattern of electrical activity in its various segments. I even know that position of every atom and its subatomic structure. I know everything that the materialist says your mind is. Do I thereby know everything about your mind? It certainly seems not. On the contrary, I know nothing about your mind. I know nothing about which conscious states you are in -- whether you are morose or manic, for example -- and what these states feel like to you. So knowledge of your brain does not give me knowledge of your mind. How then can the two said to be identical?
Is the premise of this argument, the proposed fact that knowing every physical aspect of one's brain does not reveal its subjective experience, true? Is this argument good?
This at least cannot be entirely true. Shouldn't one be able to deduce whether a brain is conscious and the extent of said consciousness, if any, via knowledge of its physical factors? Shouldn't there be some physical thing, or collection of things, on which the formation and storage of memories rely upon? Shouldn't the investigation these physical things at least give some information of one's subjective experience?
What can we not know about one's subjective experience regardless of what we know about one's brain in a physical aspect?