On Aristotle's conception, yes. There is a subtle distinction between the potential and the possible, and the reality of the possible (as in possible worlds) is a controversial issue. Lewis is the chief proponent of modal realism, granting full reality to the possible worlds, the same reality as to our actual world, but this is even more exuberant than moral realism or mathematical platonism. Felt in Impossible Worlds contrasts this statism about the possible (common in the analytic philosophy) to Aristotle's original conception of the potential:
"The shadow of Parmenides seems to lie over these discussions. For whether with Lewis one takes possible worlds to be as real as the actual, or one tries to replace them solely by the actual, the upshot seems the same: all is reduced to a planar understanding of what it means to be. In these controversies the anti-Parmenidean (Aristotelian) notion of potentiality, as an intrinsic character of the actual, has tended to be supplanted by possibilities (in the plural), Lewis’s “ways things could have been,” purely formal and discrete patterns. The dynamism of potentiality has been exchanged for a dust of homeless forms.
[...] The link between Actuality and Possibility lies not in possibilities but in potentiality. This potentiality is grounded in the actuality of the settled past and in the dynamic actuality of present process. Thus the new actual is always growing out of the womb of the potential, but the potential is itself rooted in and structured by past actuality.The actualists are therefore right in denying an independence to the possible. On the other hand, to be potentially is really a way to be, even though it is not to be actually. And this of course is just what Aristotle said in response to Parmenides, who conceived of only one way of being, being in actuality.
In scientific applications the static conception is often the preferred one since it is easier formalizable, indeed one can see calculus as decomposing motion and change into "purely formal and discrete patterns" and "dust of homeless instants". In tellingly named Why Mathematical Solutions of Zeno's Paradoxes Miss the Point Papa-Grimaldi makes the case that this is exactly why they do so. His contrast to Parmenides is... Hegel:
"The response of the pluralists and all those who embraced a similar philosophical creed (see in more recent times Hegel and Bergson) was to refuse to think of the existent as being, but to think of it as becoming. This as I said, though, was not a solution to Zeno’s paradoxes as it simply embraces a new “logic”, the logic of becoming that denies the identity... Intrinsic dynamism is alien to he constitution of our thought... The only way “out” not of the paradox, out of the immobility to which the identity tautologically forces the arrow, would be to claim that the arrow does not have to be thought of as occupying a space always equal to itself, but that we should Hegelianly rise above the “thinking that belongs to the understanding lone” and have an intuition of the arrow as never occupying a space equal to itself. This is the Hegelian key to the interpretation of reality and movement... that privileges an experience of movement over an aseptic attempt to understand it."
In a sense, this is the old clash between the poetic and the technical, even the "potential" energy of mechanics is only a shadow of its Aristotelian conception. The configuration space, that duplicates the physical space to have somewhere to put the arrow's velocity, is another shadow of the suppressed dynamism. A prominent recent proponent of the dynamic possible, although he prefers the term "virtual" to "potential", is unsurprisingly a continental philosopher, Deleuze, see How does the concept of the 'virtual' (Deleuze) relate to 'counterfactuals' (Lewis)? Here is from his Difference and Repetition:
"The virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual. The virtual is fully real in so far as it is virtual. Exactly what Proust said of states of resonance must be said of the virtual: “Real without being actual, ideal without being abstract”; and symbolic without being fictional. Indeed, the virtual must be defined as strictly a part of the object – as though the object had one part of itself in the virtual into which it plunged as though into an objective dimension."