Why can’t we eliminate talk of necessity and possible worlds, for talk of analyticity and (non-modal) logical consistency? Has there been any attempt in recent times to do this? I'm not 100% sure, but I think this is what logical positivists believed was correct, and logical positivism as a whole isn’t very popular anymore. But I still don’t understand why this particular view doesn’t come up anymore (or does it?).
As an example, any time I hear of a statement, P, being possible or necessary, I usually rephrase it in my mind as P being consistent or its negation being inconsistent. And if we’re talking about P being metaphysically necessary, I take it to mean it follows logically from some (implicitly or explicitly) assumed laws of metaphysics. If it’s physically necessary, I take it to mean it follows logically from some (implicitly or explicitly assumed) laws of physics. And so on for any other type of necessity. In this way, necessity can be eliminated in favor of formal rules of logic, assumptions (metaphysical, physical, or other), and formal substitution (ex. replacing defined predicates, like “is a bachelor”, with their definiens, “is unmarried, and a man”). An example of this is the problem of evil. Some atheists claim that it is impossible that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, and there is evil in the world. In response, theists can put the burden on the atheists and ask for a contradiction to be derived – a modal notion of impossibility (the impossibility of God and evil existing in the same world) is demanded to be shown to be inconsistent (a logical or semantic notion) for it to be properly understood and analyzed. It looks like we try to eliminate modal talk with logic-talk.
But… if this is correct then “possible worlds” aren’t needed. Just (non-modal) logic and unpacking of definitions. What’s wrong with this view?
I know Quine argued against analyticity, but according to page 14, question 4, of this, most philosophers still accept the analytic-synthetic distinction (or at least, it’s not completely dead). Anyways, in Two Dogmas (I don’t have it on hand but I seem to recall) Quine was open to some kinds of formal and explicit definitions as a legitimate kind of analyticity.
Are there any other reasons for rejecting the view that all necessary statements can be analyzed into analytic statements?