That is to say you ponder and take into consideration ideas or figures who would agree with your view and reject others because it's easier for you to do this than to detach yourself emotionally from what you want to believe (If you are wrong you would be emotionally devastated).
This could be one of the reasons why most people listen to the same mass-media or read the same newspapers. They want somebody telling them what they want o hear instead of looking for different views and ideas.
Philosophically the "truth" has been a popular idea to be pondered..and if one wishes to analyze 'truth' the various paths can be taken-
Truth is one of the central a vast subject in philosophy.
It would be impossible to describe all there is to say about truth in any coherent way.
what truths are, and what (if anything) makes them true.
Whether there is a metaphysical problem of truth at all, and if there is, what kind of theory might address it, are all standing issues in the theory of truth. One can see a number of distinct ways of answering these questions.
The neo-classical theories of truth- a. The correspondence theory b. The neo-classical correspondence theory c. The coherence theory d. Pragmatist theories
The basic idea of the correspondence theory is that what we believe or say is true if it corresponds to the way things actually are – to the facts.
A belief is true if and only if it corresponds to a fact.
The leading idea of the correspondence theory is familiar. It is a form of the older idea that true beliefs show the right kind of resemblance to what is believed.
Many idealists at that time did indeed hold coherence theories. Let us take as an example Joachim (1906). (This is the theory that Russell (1910a) attacks.) Joachim says that:
“Truth in its essential nature is that systematic coherence which is the character of a significant whole” (p. 76).
A different perspective on truth was offered by the American pragmatists. As with the neo-classical correspondence and coherence theories, the pragmatist theories go with some typical slogans.
For example, Peirce is usually understood as holding the view that:
“Truth is the end of inquiry”.
(See, for instance, Hartshorne et al., 1931–58, §3.432.) Both Peirce and James are associated with the slogan that:
“Truth is satisfactory to believe”.
The correspondence theory of truth expresses the very natural idea that truth is a content-to-world or word-to-world relation:
what we say or think is true or false in virtue of the way the world turns out to be. We suggested that, against a background like the metaphysics of facts, it does so in a straightforward way.
Truth is the aim of assertion.
A person making an assertion, the platitude holds, aims to say something true.
It is easy to cast this platitude in a way that appears false. Surely, many speakers do not aim to say something true. Any speaker who lies does not. Any speaker whose aim is to flatter, or to deceive, aims at something other than the truth.
The motivation for the truth-assertion platitude is rather different. It looks at assertion as a practice, in which certain rules are constitutive. As is often noted, the natural parallel here is with games, like chess or baseball, which are defined by certain rules.
An assertion by its nature presents what it is saying as true, and any assertion which fails to be true is ipso facto liable to criticism, whether or not the person making the assertion himself wished to have said something true or to have lied.
Whether or not assertion has such constitutive rules is, of course, controversial. But among those who accept that it does, the place of truth in the constitutive rules is itself controversial. The leading alternative, defended by Williamson (1996), is that knowledge, not truth, is fundamental to the constitutive rules of assertion. Williamson defends an account of assertion based on the rule that one must assert only what one knows.
Many of the papers mentioned in this piece can be found in the anthologies edited by Blackburn and Simmons (1999) and Lynch (2001b). There are a number of book-length surveys of the topics discussed here, including Burgess and Burgess (2011), Kirkham (1992), and Künne (2003). Also, a number of the topics discussed here, and many further ones, are surveyed at more length in papers in Glanzberg (2018).