I am reading "The Varieties of Reference" by Gareth Evans and there is that term "genuine singular term". I know what a singular term is but when is it "genuine"?
Does someone have an idea?
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See Gottlob Frege's Sense and reference :
It is clear from the context that by sign and name I have here understood any designation figuring as a proper name, which thus has as its meaning a definite object (this word taken in the widest range), but not a concept or a relation, which shall be discussed further in another article. The designation of a single object can also consist of several words or other signs [see example : "the point of intersection of a and b"]. For brevity, let every such designation be called a proper name.
In footnote, Frege refers to :
In the case of an actual proper name such as 'Aristotle' ...
In some texts "actual" proper names has been called "genuine" proper names. See e.g.
Frege’s footnote makes clear that this is not how things are in natural language for genuine proper names: "In the case of an actual proper name such as ‘Aristotle’ ..."
See also A.N. Whitehead & B. Russell, Principia Mathematica (1910), Introduction, page 64 :
We may, in fact, distinguish names of different orders as follows: (a) Elementary names will be such as are true "proper names," i.e. conventional appellations not involving any description. (b) First-order names will be such as involve a description by means of a first-order function; [...]
See also : Saul Kripke, Reference and Existence : The John Locke Lectures 1973, Oxford UP (2013), page 13 :
Russell would hold that such a name [an "empty" name] does have a sense given by a descriptive phrase. But then, he holds that the things that we ordinarily call ‘names’ aren’t really names, and that we have to leave it to analysis to discover what the genuine [emphasis mine] names really are. One of the criteria that are demanded by this argument to apply to names — genuine names of genuine objects — is that they have to name objects such that we can’t even meaningfully raise the question about whether they exist.