About Thomas Kuhn's semantic incommensurability:
Early on Kuhn drew a parallel with Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of translation (1970a, 202; 1970c, 268). According to the latter, if we are translating one language into another, there are inevitably a multitude of ways of providing a translation that is adequate to the behaviour of the speakers. None of the translations is the uniquely correct one, and in Quine's view there is no such thing as the meaning of the words to be translated. It was nonetheless clear that Quine's thesis was rather far from Kuhn's thesis, indeed that they are incompatible. First, Kuhn thought that incommensurability was a matter of there being no fully adequate translation whereas Quine's thesis involved the availability of multiple translations. Secondly, Kuhn does believe that the translated expressions do have a meaning, whereas Quine denies this. Thirdly, Kuhn later went on to say that unlike Quine he does not think that reference is inscrutable—it is just very difficult to recover (1976, 191).
[source: "Thomas Kuhn" in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, A.Bird, 2011]
In which sense "Quine denies that the translated expressions do have a sense"? Is it related to a different notion of sense in Kuhn and in Quine? If yes, is it correct to argue that Kuhn accepted the G.Frege's notion of sense, whereas Quine refused it? Given the differences above, which are the similarities between Kuhn and Quine about the indeterminacy of the translation?