- The fact is true.
- She has justifiable reasons to conclude it is true.
These conditions are not sufficient ('not enough') for knowledge because the fact may be true and she, X, may have justifiable reasons to conclude that it is true but those justifiable reasons may lead X only accidentally to conclude that it is true.
Suppose X is walking down a long, dark corridor. At the end there is a hologram of Y, her friend. Suppose that in the given conditions it is perceptually impossible to tell that she is seeing a hologram rather than her friend. In any case, she has visited her friend here often enough and there has never been a hologram before. So X has justifiable reasons to conclude that her friend is at the end of the corridor. How sceptically cautious are we going to require her to be ? By normal standards of evidence she is justified in concluding that her friend is at the end of the corridor. Now, suppose it is also a fact that her friend really is at the end of the corridor, behind and concealed by the hologram.
In this case (1) is true - her friend is at the end of the corridor and (2) is true - she is justified in concluding that her friend is at the end of the corridor. But because the perceptual causal chain is 'deviant' she doesn't know that her friend is standing there.
So (1) and (2) aren't enough for knowledge.
What you might choose to consider is the view, revived and powerfully argued for by Timothy Williamson, that belief is unnecessary for knowledge. The relation between knower and known does not include belief. This view is put forward in Williamson's Knowledge and Its Limits, ISBN 10: 019925656X / ISBN 13: 9780199256563. Published by OUP Oxford, 2002.
Another approach which can in certain versions eliminate belief from the conditions for knowledge is externalism. Here what matters is how a certain state of mind has come about; provided there is the 'right' causal connection between my state of mind and the external world, I can know without believing. If you ask me the French word for 'book', I answer 'livre'. There is an immediate disposition to say, 'livre', and this disposition is (let's assume) causally linked through memory to my learning French rather a long time ago. Of course, if you take a dispositional view of belief then to believe here just is to be disposed to answer 'livre'. But I do not think you are using this sense of 'belief'. And the idea of my having justifiable reasons for my answer simply doesn't apply. I haven't a clue how and when I learned that 'book' translates as 'livre'.