Short answer: Yes, by many philosophers!
I will try to provide a short (and obviously not exhaustive) intellectual history of such theories.
One of the first modern authors who elaborated on the punchline of Hegel that knowledge is necessarily historical was Wilhelm Dilthey with his philosophy of life (1883). He basically was the first author explicitly writing about historical a priori (a term not used by him and nailed decades later by Foucault in his Archaeology of Knowledge, 1969). His work has been systematically applied by Georg Misch in his Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie. Eine Auseinandersetzung der Diltheyschen Richtung mit Heidegger und Husserl, Leipzig 1930 (3. Aufl. Stuttgart 1964). Dilthey's work was very influential in intellectual circles in Germany and ended up in hermeneutical writings by e.g. Ernst Cassirer (Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, 1923-29), Helmuth Plessner (The Levels of the Organic and the Human, 1928), Heidegger (Being and Time, 1927), and Gadamer (Truth and Method, 1960), all of which bind human understanding to dynamic cultural development, both phylogenetically (individual life, single generation) and ontogenetically (over the course of history).
While Dilthey was among the first, there is another huge tradition in modern philosophy that purported dynamic concepts of truth and ultimately ended up in postmodernism: Classical pragmatism. Starting from Peirce (1878/79), continuing with Wiliam James' pluralistic universe (1909) and Dewey's concept of "experience" (Experience and Nature, 1928), they all have in common that meaning and truth are dependent on the particular pragmatic context and experience of individual life-worlds (even if all of them have idealistic tendencies in some writings).
This ultimately led to late Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations, 1953) and all the traditions starting from there (see e.g. Rorty vs. Putnam!). For some essays regarding this, see Mike Sandbothe & William Egginton (eds.) (2004): The pragmatic turn in philosophy: Contemporary engagements between analytic and continental thought. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Another quite famous and influential intellectual line came from Marx/Engels (rejecting the idealistic drive of Hegel) to Horkheimer and Adorno (Frankfurt School) with their Negative Dialectics, 1966 (acknowledging the materialistic dialictics, rejecting the absolute outcome). From there, Habermas (Theory of Communicative Action, 1981) and Honneth (The Struggle for Recognition, 1992) are the main successors.
Bergson and Whitehead are rightly mentioned as contemporaries outside of any particular tradition as well by @Conifold in his comment to the question. They have influences everywhere.
Interestingly, all authors mentioned were quite fond of Hegel's basic insights, with a tendency to condemn him because of the Absolute.
Therefore, if you like, aspects of Hegel's work (the Owl of Minerva...) set off an anti-idealistic concept of dynamic truth in many contemporary traditions. And they are still chewing on the problems this brings for an evaluation of sciences and philosophy.