My answer to the question posed is “No,” given that the referenced divide is but another symptom of the culture wars and science wars which have been raging between realists and antirealists in academic philosophy itself for decades, and which if one reads the responses of the various philosophical cognoscenti is alive and well on this very site. (For those familiar with the cast of characters, can Jobermark and Jo Wehler, for instance, ever hope to have a fruitful and reasonable discussion? Not likely. And my claim is that the reason for this, as described below, is closely related to why the partisanship described in the OP has come to exist.)
Accordingly, I consider the controversy issues to be much deeper than characterized by the OP, or by @Alexander S King’s explication of the Habermas (whose sophistic Frankfurt School critical theorists colleagues may in fact have contributed to what has come to be a fairly intractable problem) ideology.
In fact, it seems to me that the partisan divisiveness has arisen from popular culture’s [pundits’, those who tell the public, who are either too busy or too uninterested to think these very complex issues through, what to think and why] undue, unwarranted and hyperbolic skepticism with respect to whether objective [rather than lived] truth even exists (deflationism); whether knowledge is anything more than a function of power; whether empiricism actually provides positive knowledge of the world in light of the purported myth of the given, the theory ladenness of perceptions; and whether rationality/reason is as reliable and universal a means to achieving truth and knowledge as had been previously believed.
Of course SOME moderate skepticism about these concepts IS warranted by such notions such as holism, underdetermination. the myth of the given and others developed over the course of the 20th century. But these controversies, originally confined to academic logicians, epistemologists and philosophers of science, were usurped by academic sociologists (as the sociology of knowledge/science), whose proper domain would seem to have been discovering the social causes of people/scientists having whatever beliefs/theories they in fact do have. Not whether there are sufficient grounds to justify/warrant considering those beliefs to be designated as “knowledge” (since Kant the domain of epistemology, later to be shared logic and the philosophy of science).
This did not last long. After Quine’s historicization and naturalization of epistemology, it was not long before sociologists, historians and some philosophers of science began to claim BOTH that all beliefs/knowledge claims have social causes, and that to produce a social explanation for having a belief ipso facto discredits it, and prevents it from constituting positive knowledge. Finally concluding that knowledge is socially constructed all the way down. And with, for instance Harry Collins, that "the natural world in no way constrains what is believed to be...and must be treated as though it did not affect our perception of it," and that "what is needed is radical uncertainty about how things about nature are known." (See John Zammito's A Nice Derangement of Epistemes, p. 152.) This [radical and unwarranted] blending of ontology and epistemology is needed because, as Bruno Latour tells us, science is in fact politics by other means.
After festering in academia for decades, and continuing down the slippery slope, these ideas were published to the lay general public in a substantially oversimplified and hyperbolic form by ignorant and/or sophistic pundits, politicians, journalists, and non-natural scientist academics ignorant of the underlying evidence. (Given the subject matter of these claims, who cares about evidence, anyway?).
Not surprisingly, the net result of this history is a political ethos in which the regulative power of David Patrick Moynihan’s epigram that everyone is entitled to their own opinion, but not their own facts has been lost in the blurring of the boundary between fact and opinion. This has provided fertile ground for concepts like "fake news," "Post Truth," alternative facts," is part of the reason why so many of our arguments have devolved into creating and destroying straw men, invective, and ad hominem, and premised to a large extent upon critical theory’s naturalized identitarian epistemology (lived experiences, socially situated/located knowledge), essentially tribalism, which has stepped into the epistemological vacuum.
What can one reasonably expect when it is believed by an increasing number of the population, some of whose even primary education deflated any notion of truth as correspondence with the natural world, that knowledge is not to be constrained by the world but is a function of power?
This 2014 debate venued in Canada is instructive. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a8kcNJLpRJ4. Party A apparently wants to honestly and in good faith debate an issue that Party B contends has already been resolved, such that party B is justified in simply shutting down (“deplatforming”) anyone who would have the audacity to dispute Party B’s conclusion. One side to the debate is firmly ensconced in the silo whose genealogy is the history described above, and who would consider the other side to be naïve metaphysical realists. The likelihood that the parties to the CBA debate, whose salience attribution is so disparate that they are not simply disagreeing with one another, but are almost literally talking about different things, will ever communicate with one another is, I believe, quite slim.
The dynamics of this debate mirror the partisan controversy described by the OP, and, again, makes me pessimistic about philosophy’s ability to put the deflationist genie and its train of post truth, alternative facts and fake news back in the bottle.
(In the context of these issues, see (What is the role of public intellectual/philosopher in "post truth" world?; and Looking for a book to compliment Zammito and Mohanty in understanding the ethos of post positivistic realism.