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I know my question here is related : According to Hasker's emergent dualism, why does the mind have to be spatial?

However, this is not a duplicate. Can Hasker's emergent substance dualism approach work with the idea that the mind is a non-spatial entity? He assumes that the mind is spatial because of the relationship between brain matter and mind in his approach. However, it has been shown if the mind is spatial and contains energy, it cannot account for qualia.

So again, would Hasker's idea (substance mind emerged from matter) work with a non-spatial and non-energy mind?

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    "It has been shown if the mind is spatial and contains energy, it cannot account for qualia". It is generally doubtful that with entities as vague as mind and qualia anything can be definitively shown. If you mean Dilley's arguments they are hardly conclusive. His discussion of energy is largely moot, for example, mind can act causally in an energy neutral manner. It is also unclear what is left of "Hasker's idea" after making mind non-spatial. What exactly do you want to keep? – Conifold Nov 11 '18 at 20:12
  • @Conifold That the mind is emergent from matter, but is a non-spatial entity. I don't see why this is such a problem, could you explain? – Noah Nov 11 '18 at 23:17
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    It may not be a problem, one can think that space itself is emergent or relational. But Hasker's idea was to make dualism more palatable by eliminating mystical elements, and having non-spatial mind emerge from spatial matter hardly helps. – Conifold Nov 11 '18 at 23:29
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    Popper's substance dualism has mind emerge from matter, and holds mind is non-spacial, but in time. So it sounds like you want Popper's emergent dualism, rather than Hasker's. – Dcleve Nov 12 '18 at 15:39
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    I just read your link, where Dilley makes the claim "if the mind is spatial and contains energy, it cannot account for qualia". Dilley has a variety of good critiques of Hasker, but this one, which he itemizes as point 3 of his list, is the weakest. He is assuming that modal arguments against materialism are valid, and matter is simply incapable of supporting qualia. If this is true, then making mind spacial and energy dependent is to make it material, and incapable of supporting qualia. However, note that the conclusion he drew, HE ALSO ASSUMES! This argument is circular in his paper. – Dcleve Nov 12 '18 at 16:10

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