In social psychology, naïve realism is the human tendency to believe that we see the world around us objectively, and that people who disagree with us must be uninformed, irrational, or biased. It is considered as one of the four major insights in the field.
The three tenets that make up a naïve realist:
- Believe that they see the world objectively and without bias.
- Expect that others will come to the same conclusions, so long as they are exposed to the same information and interpret it in a rational manner.
- Assume that others who do not share the same views must be ignorant, irrational, or biased.
The last two tenets are the necessarily results of following logic. The question is: would the first one is too?
In my understanding, logic only studies the relationship between statements, not the truth value of the premise. For example, if we have a deduction:
All men are motorbikes.
Socrates is a man.
Therefore, Socrates is a motorbike.
Then logic only confirms whether the conclusion fits the premise. Even if the induction is made with scientific method, then a logician will still assume that there is a chance that the premise is wrong.
However, if they have checked and tested the premise many times, then they have to believe that their action to see the world is objectively and without bias. This is more true in the case that logician acknowledges their human biases and distortions, and has done everything in their best to check that. The belief that they are objective and the belief that they may be wrong aren't mutually exclusive. That belief, therefore, is a necessary consequence of believing in logic.
To put it in another way, there are 3 additional arguments in parallel with the specific problem the logician has to deal with:
- A: They follow the laws of logic
- B: They know that they may be wrong
- C: They are objective and have no bias
I think A is sufficient to conclude C (in fact it may be that A ⇔ C). B is an additional filter to make sure (a) A actually exists, (b) the premises of the specific problem are correct, and (c) no implicit premise is overlooked or forgotten. But at the same time it makes the logician less confident at the moment they need to be. B makes A believable and makes C unbelievable, even though A and C are the same.
Is that correct? Does following logic necessarily require one to conclude that they are objective and have no bias?
Related:
• Is there any research about how philosophical ideas become maladaptive thoughts?
• Does following logic necessarily require one to conclude that they are objective and have no bias?