While reading Douglas Walton's "Historical Origins of Argumentum ad Consequentiam", I realized there is at least one argument style that appears reasonable but which has been labelled as a logical fallacy only recently.

Walton writes: (page 251)

In fact, argumentation from consequences was identified as a specific type of argument with a distinctive form in the ancient world, was known to the ancients as such, and does have a long history. However, it did not appear to be recognized as a fallacy in the ancient sources. That recognition as a fallacy appears to have come much later, in a nineteenth century logic textbook.

What I am looking for are other argumentation styles that became named fallacies only recently. The argumentation from consequences would be one example of what I am looking for.

Are there any others?

References to studies like Walton's showing the recent labeling of the argumentation style as a fallacy would provide justification for any answer.

Here are some candidates from the comments:

  • (1903) Moore's naturalistic fallacy (thanks to Conifold)
  • (1941) C. S. Lewis' bulverism (thanks to Conifold)


Walton, D. (1999). Historical origins of argumentum ad consequentiam. Argumentation, 13(3), 251-264. http://www.dougwalton.ca/papers%20in%20pdf/99origins.pdf

  • 1
    How recent is recent? Politician's syllogism and subvarieties of cherry picking come to mind. SEP Fallacies gives a historical timeline that might be helpful. You should also look at Hamblin's Fallacies, which was a watershed in the modern approach to the subject. He showed that there is altogether too much nonsense written about fallacies in the textbooks, and, the naming sport notwithstanding, many named "fallacies", as used in the context, are not fallacies at all.
    – Conifold
    Commented Nov 22, 2018 at 0:02
  • @Conifold The example Walton wrote about was first viewed as a fallacy in the 19th century. Anything over the past 300 years would be recent. I'll check out Hamblin's fallacies. Thank you! Commented Nov 22, 2018 at 0:11
  • 2
    Then you can add Moore's naturalistic fallacy (1903) and C.S. Lewis's bulverism (1941) to the list. Of course, the fallaciousness (of the former, especially) is disputable.
    – Conifold
    Commented Nov 22, 2018 at 0:36
  • 1
    You may already know this site, it be useful for cross-referencing: logicallyfallacious.com/tools/lp/Bo/LogicalFallacies
    – christo183
    Commented Nov 22, 2018 at 7:45
  • 1
    An important insight, not always obvious to those of a logical bent. A blunt charge of irrationality not only dismisses the person, but also creates a divide in discourse counter productive to comprehension.
    – christo183
    Commented Nov 22, 2018 at 13:29

1 Answer 1


One way to approach the question of what argument styles have only recently been labeled fallacies is to list those that are not recent. As a base-line there are 13 fallacies that can be traced to Aristotle's Sophistical Refutations.

Hans Hansen lists the fallacies recorded by Aristotle:

  1. equivocation,
  2. amphiboly,
  3. combination of words,
  4. division of words,
  5. accent,
  6. form of expression,
  7. accident,
  8. secundum quid,
  9. consequent,
  10. non-cause,
  11. begging the question,
  12. ignoratio elenchi,
  13. many questions

The following include additional lists provided by Hansen that might be excluded if they are not recent enough.

  • (1690) John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
  • (1724) Isaac Watts, Logick; or, The Right Use of Reason
  • (1824) Jeremy Bentham, Handbook of Political Fallacies
  • (1826) Richard Whately, Elements of Logic (Book III)
  • (1843) John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (Book V)
  • (1961) Irving Copi, Introduction to Logic

Hansen, Hans, "Fallacies", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/fallacies/.

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