I don't think this is best taken as a stand-alone question. Different assumptions can lie behind it.
Practical 'oughts' and truth-aptness
'You ought to take this flight' might be a truncated hypothetical. If (a) we complete it with, 'You ought to take this flight if you want to get the fastest from B to A' and (b) it is true that you do want to get the fastest from B to A, and (c) the 'ought' here is not moral but practical or 'technical' or predictive, it can perfectly well be true that you ought to take this advice. It simply contains a practical truth.
Moral 'oughts' : fact/ value versus is/ ought
When 'ought' has a moral dimension, to indicate what you have a moral duty or obligation to do, matters become more complex.
Suppose the fact/ value distinction is bogus : suppose it is a fact that justice is a good and so is honesty and so is gratitude and so is benevolence and so on and on. Suppose e.g. 'justice is a good' (an evaluation or evaluational statement) has truth-conditions which are satisfied.
Situational moral truth-aptness
The moral prescription (or prescriptive statement) would not follow that you (morally) *ought' to act justly in a particular situation. Evaluations do not yield prescriptions. This is because (for one reason) there is a plurality of moral values, not all of which are compossible in particular situations and which cannot be lexically ordered. More simply : there is no guarantee that specific values will not situationally clash and there is no plausible way of ordering the different moral values in order of priority. We cannot say that justice always is morally more important than gratitude, or gratitude always less important than benevolence. Moral values, with apologies to Plato, are rivalrous in particular situations for action.
So even if it is true that justice is a good, the corresponding moral prescription does not follow that you ought to act justly in such-and-such a situation; benevolence might have situational priority.
Now, whether situational prescriptions, e.g. 'In this situation you ought to act benevolently rather than justly', are truth-apt. is not at all clear to me. All I can say is that if the fact/ value distinction is bogus, and there can be moral facts such as 'justice is good', I can see no reason in principle why situational prescriptions ('you ought to act justly in this situation') cannot be truth-apt too. All I have stressed is that there is no straight implication from 'justice is good' to 'you ought to act justly in this situation'.
'But how can prescriptions be truth-apt if they are commands ? Doesn't your argument break down at and on this point ?' Not at all.
Prescriptions are not commands
I quite see that commands are not truth-apt but 'you ought to act justly in this situation' is not a command. 'You ought to act justly in this situation' is a prescription, a statement about what you ought to do, and nothing like what it would have to be if it were a command such as 'Act justly !'