What is the relation between pragmatism and intentionality?
Two different enterprises in philosophy seem to be well established and yet contradicting:
Inferential Pragmatism: from Wittgenstein and Sellars to Rorty, Brandom and Mcdowell, There's an enterprise of explaining meaning in the way we use words in inference or behaviour. Briefly, the meaning of a proposition is determined by its inferential relations to other propositions.
Intentionality: The enterprise of the naturalisation of intentionality suggests a few different ways to approach the notion of semantic content and meaning, among them teleosemantics, information semantics, or conceptual role semantics.
The theory of conceptual role semantics as proposed by Ned Block is widely rejected by most thinkers in the field for being holistic.
My question is as following:
Are the two enterprises refer to the same question when they discuss meaning?
If so, it seems like the first enterprise takes meaning to be conceptual role, while conceptual role semantics is rejected by the second enterprise. Why don't they converse with each other?
If not so, how are the two different? I suspect they might be dealing with different subjects since the first enterprise is epistemological while the second is in the philosophy of mind. Yet, to me, it seems like both, in the end, want to say something about the nature of intentionality.