Refer: Christopher Langan, "An Introduction to Mathematical Metaphysics", Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, vol. 13, no. 2, 2017
Accepting syntax is that part or aspect of the mechanical structure or programming of a computational automaton which enables it to accept or "recognize" input; the concept can be generalized to non-mechanistic transduction.
Now given that isomorphic content is the 'meaning' conveying, or as Hofstadter has it, the understanding part of language.
Does Langan see syntax as meaning free, or as conveying meaning on the metaphysical level? (And of course if this is a false dichotomy, please explain)
Bonus: Is there a way to reconcile these views?
EDIT: As Mauro points out the question steps all over the clearly defined distinction between 'semantics' and 'syntax'. The problem comes from the way Langan uses 'syntax' as some kind of semantic signifier, that is a pre-inpunt/(information transfer) 'flag' or 'header' that prompts a system to accept isomorphic input from another system.