I think if I may say so that you are a tad narrow in your characterisation of language.
Properties and language
Language must be used to refer to objects if it is to describe the properties of objects, so at least that extension is required. And since there can be no description of objects without reference to those objects, I should have thought that if anything it is the reference to objects that is logically prior in our characterisation of language.
'A sentence can only succeed so far as to be able to list the properties or characteristics.' 'The' properties ? All the properties or only those relevant to the point or purpose of the sentence ?
Among properties do you count negative properties as real or genuine ?
Do you allow emergent properties ? Disjunctive properties ?
(1) Are properties universals or tropes? (2) Are properties attributes of particulars,
or are particulars just bundles of properties? (3) Are properties categorical (qualitative) in
nature, or are they powers? (4) If a property attaches to a particular, is this predication
contingent, or is it necessary? (David M. Armstrong, 'Four Disputes about Properties', Synthese, Vol. 144, No. 3, Dispositions and Laws of Nature (Apr., 2005), pp. 309-320: 309.)
Properties and definition
In a definition, X = Y, the properties included in Y can be (a) only necessary, (b) only sufficient (as in Wittgenstein's family resemblance concepts), or (c) necessary and sufficient, to press the matter no further. Any of these, (a) - (c), may be sufficient to constitute definition?
Language and communication
Aside from this tangle of issues about properties, I'd stress the communicative function of language:
We can use [language] to
convey wishes and commands, to tell truths and to tell lies, to influence our
hearers and to vent our emotions, and to formulate ideas which could probably never arise if we had no language in which to embody them. We can
even use language to communicate with ourselves; in fact, such self
communication seems to constitute much of what we call "thinking." (William G. Moulton, 'The Nature of Language', Daedalus, Vol. 102, No. 3, Language as a Human Problem (Summer, 1973), pp. 17-35: 17.)
Not all of these functions involve, so far as I can see, the description of properties of objects; and all of them, I venture, at least do far more than this as part of their essential purpose.