In bayesianism, you get probalities for the truth of any given statement. As I understand it, this can never be 100%. Since there is no "most certain" you can be, does that mean there is no conception of knowledge?

I can see pragmatic definitions of knowledge that rely on being sure enough to outweigh the cost of being wrong, but I'm asking about epistemological knowledge rather than pragmatic.

  • 3
    Very few believe today that any knowledge, epistemological or otherwise, is infallible, nor does the traditional definition of knowledge (as justified true belief) require certainty. It may well be that some of what we think we know is true (and hence we do know it), or perhaps a lot, but we can not be "100% certain" about any of it. Bayesianism simply quantifies the uncertainty in a particular way, see formal epistemology.
    – Conifold
    Feb 1, 2019 at 23:22
  • So essentially bayesianism doesn't say anything on the topic of knowledge then?
    – rtpax
    Feb 2, 2019 at 0:37
  • We have to distinguish between the formal apparatus, which is more or less neutral, and the more loaded Bayesian Epistemology, which favors coherentism, and is one of the top contenders in the methodology of science (along with forms of falsificationism), see Hypothesis testing: Fisher vs. Popper vs. Bayes. A major point of contention is the role of induction in acquiring knowledge, see also Did Karl Popper argue against Bayesian inference?
    – Conifold
    Feb 2, 2019 at 1:06


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