Can there be objective moral facts that have no innate imperative bindingness – what everyone ought to do regardless of their needs and preferences?

Question

My interest is in presenting results from the science of social morality in ways that will be culturally useful. (This science is the study of the origins and function of behaviors motivated by our moral sense and advocated by past and present cultural moral codes.) But these ‘facts’ about socially moral behaviors are the normal kind in science – they have no innate imperative bindingness. Does that rule them out as “moral facts”?

On the other hand, it seems silly to insist these science derived facts about morality and the cultural moralities that can be built on are not “objectively” moral since they are as objective as the rest of science.

Just as an example to clarify my question, one proposed universally moral principle within social morality is “increase the benefits of cooperation without exploiting others”. As a product of science, it is objectively universally moral within the category of social morality but it has no innate bindingness. Could any morality built on it be coherently called an objective (mind-independent) morality?

Answer 1

Welcome, Mark

Facts as such have no motivational force and create no imperatives. President Kennedy died in 1963. Broccoli is nutritious. Chicago is closer to NY than NY is to London. None of these facts motivates me to do anything and none creates an imperative. Kennedy died in 1963 - so what ? It's a fact but I carry on typing; it's motivationally inert. Broccoli is nutritious - so what ? I don't like it and can get adequate nutrition in other ways.

Unless a fact, which informs a belief, can link to a desire, want or preference I have, it's motivationally irrelevant. Broccoli is nutritious - fact. Eat broccoli ! - imperative. The fact becomes relevant to my motivation, as does the imperative, only if I want a more nutritious diet and want in the light of this to eat this vegetable. If I don't, the fact about broccoli and the related imperative impinge not at all on my motivation. This is a Humean position of moral externalism; it is not necessarily wrong for that reason. Intentional action is the product of belief plus desire. Moral facts unless combined with desires, wants or preferences are external to motivation and cannot determine or even influence it.

Now, it seems to me that moral facts, if there are any, are motivationally in the same place. Suppose it is a moral fact that stealing is wrong or that one should not deceive one's partner. I can perfectly well recognise such facts, as I can the fact about broccoli, but without any motivation to act on them. I have, let us say, no desire to act morally; correspondingly, moral imperatives addressed to me have no motivational force. You may not think very well of me but where am I at fault ? Where is the irrationality in not being motivated by moral facts or moral considerations in general ?

If moral facts are binding on me regardless of my needs and preferences, this bindingness is just another moral fact to which the arguments above equally apply.

This answer is not an exercise in moral autobiography, only in moral argument.

Answer 2

Your moral intuition seems to be close to that of Immanuel Kant:

IF I (morally) ought to do something THEN this should have an impact on my faculty of desire (motivation).

The thing you are missing is close to the criticism of Kant developed by Hegel: Principles alone do nothing. They are purely formal. Any kind of bindingness or motivational form can only emerge in your active application of a principle, i.e. in the active determination/judgement that I actually ought to do this because the principle applies to the particular situation at hand (aside: Hegel's criticism is misguided since that was one major aspect of Kant's practical philosophy).

In other words: Your "fact" is about the universality of certain guiding principles and values, not about the effectiveness of them actually motivating people to act morally.

Hence, there is a difference between

1. It is a fact that X is a moral principle across cultural differences and
2. All persons are bound by X in the morally relevant situations

The simple reason is that as long as they do not judge the principle to apply to their current situation as morally relevant, they will not feel compelled by it. That not all people are moral is actually not speaking against objective principles but against people recognizing these principles as morally relevant in situations that actually are morally relevant (and deciding to act accordingly).

In fact, the only compelling aspect of principles is the consciousness of an ought (see Kant's Fact of Reason in his Critique of Practical Reason) - which may follow from or be expressed in principles or "moral laws", but is not identical with them - it needs this recognition per judgement. Kant argued for the objectivity/universality of this recognition of morality, but the universality of morality that is based on non-empirical principles is highly controversial (see early criticisms of Kant by Sidgwick and Schopenhauer). And even if you recognise this ought as morally binding, the very idea of "ought" and responsibility implies that you can choose to do otherwise.

Mind, this all is in our moral language (including the idea of a free will). It should not be misunderstood as an assertion regarding the ontological status of freedom or values. Indeed, determining the "absolute" or "real" ontological status of any object of thought (beyond cultural/interpersonal agreement like e.g. "scientific consensus") may simply be beyond us (as Kant held).