Upon pondering this question a bit. I would (informedly) answer that, yes there is in some sense.
The some sense is agreement or disagreement. Everything beyond this steps into much more noticeable subjectivity. Also, without agreement or disagreement I don't think one could have any expression and "silence" would not work for social animals for practical reasons. Thus in "Occam's razoric sense" one's left with "minimal premises" to decide on something.
However, this has a vague concept of accuracy, since the only unambiguously measurable is the count of agreement or the count of disagreement. Still it's entirely possible that 1) the question to be answered has been formulated in a bad way and 2) people passing the vote are not well-informed. Thus e.g. democracies don't really guarantee for anything. They act on much arbitrarity.
Thus I'm not sure how this answers the problem of "accuracy", because it relies on arbitrary notions of accuracy. Theoretically one could expect accuracy if one relied only on "well-informed" voters, but I'm not sure how one'd formulate criteria for being well-informed (I don't claim it to be impossible though). Relying on merely count, while being absolute, would not work for accuracy.
Thus I think that social truth may build upon some of the following:
- Demonstrated experience (replicability)
- Being able to be proven wrong with new evidence / anti-authoritarianism (fallibility)
- Relying on well-defined terms (operational definitions)
- Understanding of mathematical, physical truth and related science epistemologies, since they represent the best model for all knowledge (formality, consistency)
I would also add that since there are things that will not fit to these, then these would be perhaps categorizable as undecidable. Particularly, because without having accuracy, it would be dumb to suggest either agreement or disagreement because one cannot demonstrate anything either way. Thus it should be left as undecideable. Undecideable means that it cannot be decided either way, it can be (in order to allow distinguishing natural separation of thought from action) merely acted on "somehow", and this action is "non-determinable".