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One would expect that metaphysical facts should be independent of any particular physical details. However, examples involving physical objects and behaviors often appear in metaphysical arguments. One would imagine that if the physical details were different, the augments using them would turn out differently, leading to different metaphysical conclusions. Is there anything that guards against this?

  • I think your question is too broad. A conception of how this could be organized under NeoThomism is, Jacques Maritain, Philosophy of Nature, Philosophical Library, NY (1951). But you would have to point to a specific philosopher, and define use of the word "metaphysics" by such philosopher, in order to get an intelligent answer to such a question imo. – Gordon Feb 22 at 20:46
  • "One would expect that metaphysical facts should be independent of any particular physical details", why would one expect that? If metaphysics can not even account for physics it is no good. Of course, physics is not enough to determine metaphysics, but it does provide useful constraints that rule out non-viable metaphysics, hence the use in metaphysical arguments (for example, the strength of arguments against free will almost entirely rests on implausibility of combining it with current physics). Why guard against it? – Conifold Feb 22 at 21:08
  • Is there a more specific philosophical question that brought this question to mind? – Mark Andrews Feb 25 at 4:45

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