This is more or less just a reference request.
Sometimes, when a belief is revealed to be unjustified, we should respond by either giving up that belief or at the very least, yielding a certain amount of confidence in it. For example, I initially thought I had work last Monday, but then when I found out it was President's Day, that undercut my justification and I promptly became skeptical.
But it seems like there are other times when the lack of justification shouldn't bother us. For example, I can't justify my belief in the inductive principle. But when I became aware of this lack of justification, it didn't shake my confidence in induction---not even a little bit. Moreover, it's hard to see why it should have shaken it.
So I am led to the following:
Question. Can you guys please point me to relevant literature by philosophers who take the view that justification is not always essential for beliefs to be acceptable (in some epistemic sense)?
I guess you could argue about whether the above examples really show what I want them to show, or whether my view is wrong for some other reason. But that's not really the purpose of this question. Rather, I'd like to know if there are any competent, respected philosophers who take a view like mine, and how they express it.
EDIT: When I talk about "justification" I may be using the word more broadly than perhaps I should. For instance, Plantinga thinks that some beliefs are basic in the sense that they are not inferred from other beliefs, but nevertheless he thinks that basic beliefs should have warrant, i.e. they should be properly basic. Maybe technically that doesn't count as justification, but it's still the sort of thing that I don't buy. I'd like to find a philosopher or two who agrees that we are within epistemic norms or rights, or something like that, to take certain beliefs on "faith alone," so to speak. Forgive the religious language, but that's the best way I know how to articulate it.