If everything is ruled by determinism, what rules determinism itself?
Has any philosopher ever explored this matter?
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Sign up to join this communityIf everything is ruled by determinism, what rules determinism itself?
Has any philosopher ever explored this matter?
I am afraid I have never heard of a philosophy that explores this very point, but I have something to add in this subject.
Physical Determinism asserts that everything that exists could not be otherwise (At least this is the definition I agree with). Let us see where logic may take us here.
Our assertion is physically deterministic in essence, since most determinists (in the physical sense of determinism) would agree with it, (let us ignore quantum mechanics and suppose that physical determinism is true).
Premise : for all x, if x is the case (C) then it is not possible (not-P) for x to not be the case. With : C = be the case, and P = possible to not be the case. I chose P instead of ◇ to avoid using modal logic for a physical possibility, which would lead to a controversy).
By possible I do not mean: logical possibility in modal logic, but just 'physical' possibility if you will, that is why I only content myself with predicate logic (not modal logic). Which means that there are certain physically possible configurations that will never happen, and it is not possible for them to happen physically, not because they are impossible, but by virtue of deterministic causation that does not bring forth these configurations .
So, in predicate logic : (∀x)(Cx → ~Px)
The problem is that this proposition seems to be sufficient to define determinism, we do not need anything else other than saying that determinism is that everything that is the case is impossible to be otherwise (impossible does not mean logical impossibility here).
(∀x) means EVERYTHING , since the definition is self-sufficient, and gives an account for physical determinism, then there no reason to think that (∀x) means "everything except determinism itself".
Thanks to ChristopherE's comment, I add here that the universe of discourse (i.e: the domain over which our variables of interest range, for all x) is everything that exists (and if Determinism exists, is actual, then it is also considered part of our universe of discourse).
If we substitute x by determinism, by universal instantiation, it follows that : "If determinism is the case, then it is not possible for determinism to not be the case (to be otherwise)" .
Hence, determinism is ruled by itself, if the assertion is true (and we agree that this is indeed the definition of determinism), then it follows that determinism is impossible to be otherwise.
Of course, if it is possible to say for something that it is 'ruled by itself'.
Determinism is ruled by determinism if the premise holds.
If Determinism was ruled by something else, then not "everything" is ruled by determinism (determinism itself being one example), and thus the premise would be falsified.
Of course one could try fixing this like: "If everything except determinism was ruled by determinism..." But then, assuming there was an x that ruled determinism, that x would also have to be exempt from being rule by determinism, else determinism would rule x and thus also rule itself again. So the question would become "If everything is ruled by except determinism and x, ..." we would need to fin a y that rules x, and so forth.
So really the question is broken because it does not use any proper categories.