Could someone please explain to me why is that Kant thinks of the Cogito as an analytical proposition? Is it only because the predicate of the Cogito is already presumed in the concept of an thinking subject? Or is there a more complex argument for it?

Thanks for the attention.

  • Yes; the I is “a single thing that cannot be resolved into a plurality of subjects, and hence a logically simple subject” (B407). Thus we have the numerical identity of the self as the thinking subject. According to Kant, this proposition is analytic: “this principle of the necessary unity of apperception is, to be sure, itself identical, thus an analytic proposition” (B135). – Mauro ALLEGRANZA Mar 4 '19 at 13:20
  • Thanks for the answer. By the way, is it also correct to say that, since it is reached by introspection, for Descartes, the Cogito is not an analytical proposition, but a synthetical one (to use a kantian terminology), that is, in Descartes point of view, does the predicate of existence in the Cogito requires some sort of experience - even if it is an interior one - to be known? Or does he shares Kant's point of view on this topic? – L. Siqueira Mar 5 '19 at 16:40
  • The concept of "analytic prop" is foreign to D... But yes, the Cogito is a sort of intuition, i.e. an "inner experience" and not only an "analysis" of words (or thoughts). – Mauro ALLEGRANZA Mar 5 '19 at 16:55

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