I'm sorry if this question has been asked before.
My question regards the apparent double nature of the term 'a priori' in Kant's Critique of pure reason. Namely, as a presupposition for experience and also as independent of experience.
On one hand, in the Transcendental aesthetics, Kant consideres space and time as pure - a priori - intuitions, i.e. they're presupposed for the possibility of experience in general. In other words, experience as a whole would not be possible without them (space and time).
On the other hand, Kant uses the expression to describe a certain type of judgments, particularly, Synthetic a priori judgments. These judgments are characterised as independent of experience. The best examples of this kind of judgments are the ones we found in Euclidean geometry, which are not modifiable by experience, and hence not up to empirical verification, but they're not derivative of concepts either.
Is the difference between this two considerations of the same term a legitimate interpretation? I ask because with the advent of non Euclidean geometries and the Theory of relativity, we know that the Synthetic a priori judgments present in classical (Newtonian) mechanics and Euclidean geometries work only in those frames of references. The status of space and time as a priori intuitions however would still remain valid in any geometry or physical model. Would that be a correct assessment in your view? I can't seem to find any contradiction between those two statements. What do you think?