I am seeking published discussions or arguments about this proposition, though some discussion here would be useful:
Science can prove or provide significant evidence that the brain is the source of the mind?
Note -- I am not asking about whether the brain is the source of the mind, just whether science can throw light on that question, though I can imagine that references on the latter will also discuss the former.
Pointers to discussions of larger issues would be useful, for example, this philosophy.stackexchange question -- What is the meaning of "There are questions that science can't answer"?) -- as long as they do cover this science/mind/brain issue. Usually those discussions are mostly about ethics.
I realize that the majority of people reading this probably accept or lean toward the underlying belief that the brain is the source of the mind, or at least the main source. There is even a survey: What do philosophers believe?, Bourget, D. & Chalmers, D.J. Philosophical Studies (2014) 170: 465. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0259-7. The result on the underlying issue, posed in terms of physicalism are:
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? Physicalism: 56.5% (Accept (34.6%), Lean toward (21.9%)) Non-physicalism: 27.1% (Accept (14.2%), Lean toward (12.9%)) Other: 16.4% (The question is too unclear to answer (6.3%), Agnostic/undecided (2.5%), Accept an intermediate view (2.4%))
But to what extent do you or philosophers believe (or disbelieve) physicalism because of evidence from science, or is it more from philosophical "evidence" and/or a metaphysical assumption, perhaps influenced by the prevailing scientific zeitgeist and/or the beliefs of most (neuro)scientists that the brain is indeed the source of the mind.
Addendum to address the "on hold".
Can science (by any reasonable definition -- or should I say "natural science"?) arbitrate between physicalism and non-physicalism, or is physicalism/non-physicalism a metaphysical assumption that science simply cannot address directly? By directly, I mean within the enterprise of science, using legitimate scientific methodology by pretty much any reasonable definition.
And even if science can't directly address physicalism, maybe the undeniable success of science in general, particularly physics, is in some sense inductive evidence for physicalism.
So there are philosophical issues there. I personally believe that science cannot provide any evidence in favor of physicalism by either of those routes or by any other that I can imagine (see below for the "against" prong). Maybe lots or even most philosophers agree, maybe not. But a lot of people think science can and does provide such evidence, and maybe even settles the question in favor of physicalism. Certainly a lot of scientists believe that, particularly neuroscientists.
That's the issue. I am looking, however, not just to elucidate it, but for published work along these lines, hence the "reference request" tag. I would like to be able to cite such work in some scholarship I am doing in a non-philosophical field, where just such statements are often made or implied -- for example, "Given current neuroscientific knowledge, it is plausible to believe that the brain is the source of the mind". I'd like to be able to say (and cite), perhaps, that philosophers generally agree that science cannot directly address such issues, or at least lay out the philosophical arguments for or against that capability for science.
BTW, there is another possibility here. It is pretty widely agreed that the search for biological correlates or explanations of consciousness has thus far barely gotten off the ground -- science is thus nowhere near understanding mind in the same way physics has made great strides in understanding matter or biology understanding life. Does that failure so far constitute inductive evidence against physicalism?
I think the issues around Chalmer's "hard problem", the work of McGinn and Nagel, etc are somewhat relevant here, though they mostly address the capabilities and limitations of philosophy, not science.