Trivialism is a system that proposes that literally every proposition is true and false at the same time blatantly breaking the principle of no contradiction and triggering the principle of explosion (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trivialism)

I find this system very interesting and I would like to find a cosmological or physical theory/hypothesis/model that would be completely compatible with it. I will explain what I mean by "completely" in a little bit...

Almost all physical theories and cosmological models I've found avoid at all costs contradictions, and when some contradiction is found is either ignored or rejected. It has been a strong traditional claim and assumption in philosophy and science that inconsistencies cannot exist in reality, so all these models with inconsistencies are rejected or ignored by most of the people.

For example, physical laws break inside black holes (in the singularity). We would expect to have a lawless "place" inside black holes where everything could be allowed, but virtually no physics propose that. They propose that inside black holes, there are other, yet uknown, set of laws that could explain what happens inside, but because we cannot receive any information from the singularity, we cannot guess anything and we cannot build any set of laws that would plausibly be applied to black hole singularities.

I've also read that M-theory is inconsistent when we only assume the existence of 1 dimensional strings. I've not heard of a M-theory version with only this type of strings, so I guess this is totally rejected by physicists...Unless I am wrong and there is such model considered by physicists...Is it there?

The only set of theories that I've found that would be compatible with trivialism, are those which propose that the universe is a computer, or rather, a hypercomputer, since trivialism would certainly have uncomputable things that could only be computed by a hypercomputer. I think these models would be compatible with trivialism because they would assume that the universe is a hypercomputer and it would be made of information or something similar. Since hypercomputers (as well as brains) can compute/conceive trivialist systems, a hypercomputer-universe, or something similar, could perfectly have a trivialist nature

But then, here is when the word "completely" takes place: Even though a hypercomputer, or our brains, can work with trivialist systems, there are things that would exist in a hypothetical completely trivialist universe that we could not compute/conceive. For example, in a trivialist system, a cricle intersecting a straight line in 3 points in Euclidean geometry, would be perfectly possible (in classical logic, would be logically impossible). But although we can think of a trivialist system or universe where this could be found on its nature, we cannot know/compute/conceive how would it be or look like. Since we cannot describe things that are logically impossible to describe (like such circle), we cannot imagine/compute/conceive how would that circle be, even if we can think of a trivialist system containing it. And even if we would be somehow capable of watching them from our universe, we would see nothing since these things would be logically impossible to describe and to exist (so no mental states would represent them, and thus, we would not see anything).

So this is the problem I am trying to solve. A hypercomputer/hypercomputational information-based model of a universe could produce a universe where its laws would be evidently "governed" by trivialism (just as in our universe, our laws are evidently, at least for the majority, "governed" by classical/quantum rules). But since no hypercomputational system could compute some things that are logically impossible to describe (like the example I wrote before) not all things that would be theoretically inside a trivialist universe could exist in a hypercomputer-universe (since in computational models of the universe or even in hypercomputational models of the universe, everything that would not be computed, would not exist).

So is it there any physical/cosmological hypercomputational model that would also assume that things that would not be computed by the hypercomputer-universe would also certainly exist? Or maybe there are other different models where literally all things that trivialism would "describe" or propose, would exist and be true?...

PS: This question is better here than in Physics Stack Exchange since it asks about hypothetical models and it is not related to mainstream physics. Also, since it is related with logical systems and metaphysics, I thought this would be the best place to ask this. But, please, I'm looking for models with fundamental basis on physics and not only in philosophy (as it would happen with String Theory, Many Worlds Interpretation...) For example, Max Tegmark proposed that every mathematical proposition has a physical existence somewhere in the multiverse. Although this possibly is what I'm looking for, I found this to be too philosophical and with no real-physics basis (it only relies on philosophical assumptions). I was thinking that maybe the Holographic principle would be a good alternative to Tegmark's hypothesis (since it has some physics background and basis) but I'm not sure if it could be applied to every mathematical structure and model.

  • No, Kabay is pretty much alone at this point. The only other philosopher who seriously played with trivialism is Azzouni, but his interests are in semantics of natural languages, not physics. Also, since physics is aimed at predictions one would need some device for singling those out alternative to the truth, which is indiscriminate in trivialism, and it would end up being the truth by another name. This is similar to fictionalist re-interpretation of physics, where everything is strictly speaking false, but we get a discriminative true-according-to predicate instead.
    – Conifold
    Apr 13, 2019 at 11:18
  • It looks like trivialism endorses the Buddhist doctrine of 'Two Truths'. But this is far from trivial and has a philosophical justification. This doctrine states that positive statements about the world have one truth-value conventionally and the opposite value ultimately, or for an ultimate analysis. This explains the seemingly- contradictory language of mysticism. For rigour one one have to state both truths, as we see when Heraclitus says 'We exist and exist-not'. The question is profound and not at all trivial.
    – user20253
    Apr 13, 2019 at 14:28
  • The problem with trivialism is that it is undeniably true, but then also, it is false...
    – christo183
    May 2, 2019 at 12:21


You must log in to answer this question.