Rosalind Hursthouse and Glen Pettigrove compare virtue ethics with deontology and consequentialism:
Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach that emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism). Suppose it is obvious that someone in need should be helped. A utilitarian will point to the fact that the consequences of doing so will maximize well-being, a deontologist to the fact that, in doing so the agent will be acting in accordance with a moral rule such as “Do unto others as you would be done by” and a virtue ethicist to the fact that helping the person would be charitable or benevolent.
These three are not in direct competition with each other. Their main difference is whether virtue is fundamental or can it be defined in terms of consequences or duties:
This is not to say that only virtue ethicists attend to virtues, any more than it is to say that only consequentialists attend to consequences or only deontologists to rules. Each of the above-mentioned approaches can make room for virtues, consequences, and rules. Indeed, any plausible normative ethical theory will have something to say about all three. What distinguishes virtue ethics from consequentialism or deontology is the centrality of virtue within the theory (Watson 1990; Kawall 2009). Whereas consequentialists will define virtues as traits that yield good consequences and deontologists will define them as traits possessed by those who reliably fulfil their duties, virtue ethicists will resist the attempt to define virtues in terms of some other concept that is taken to be more fundamental.
One way to reason that virtue might be fundamental is to consider Michael Polanyi's distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge and his observation (page 7)
...all knowledge is either tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge.
If one notes that rules and consequences are explicit forms of knowledge and virtue is tacit knowledge then one has a justification for saying that virtue is fundamental and consequences and rules depend upon it.
The OP notes:
I would imagine that could send a shudder down most people's spine: at least if the main or important meta-ethical theories do not say that ethical people or decisions simply do or make for the right or ethical action, and nothing else. What is the name of that, this latter position?
If tacit knowledge is the root of all explicit knowledge, including ethical consequences and rules, as Polanyi suggests it would mean knowing this explicit knowledge is not enough for consistent ethical behavior however useful such explicit knowledge might be. One would also need to develop a virtuous character which would be a form of tacit knowing.
Hursthouse, Rosalind and Pettigrove, Glen, "Virtue Ethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/ethics-virtue/.
Polanyi, M. (1966). The logic of tacit inference. Philosophy, 41(155), 1-18.