There are a few physicists that propose that the universe is a hypercomputer. One example is Roger Penrose, who, basing in his quantum interpretation (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penrose_interpretation) and in spin networks (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spin_network), proposes that the universe is basically a giant hypercomputer.
But, since that universe would contain completely uncomputable things, doesn't that mean that these models don't assume computability? I mean, wouldn't that mean that literally every uncomputable thing could happen in these hypercomputer-universes? Even things that could not be "computed" by a hypercomputer?
In that case, then, is it possible to mathematically define a hypercomputer-universe where even things that could not be computed by that hypercomputer would exist? And if yes, wouldn't be the case that if we introduced/defined a trivialist system (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trivialism) in this hypercomputer-universe model (to produce/create or "simulate" a trivialist universe, or any other class of impossible world (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impossible_world)), then, every illogical/logically impossible things, even those illogical/logically impossible things could not be computed by a hypercomputer because they are logcially impossible or simply impossible to describe/conceive/compute, would certainly exist (in this hypercomputer-universe)?