In the first few pages of Being and Time Heidegger writes:
such an inquiry [into foundations]... still needs a guideline... it remains naive and opaque if... it leaves the meaning of being in general undiscussed (p12 SUNY Press).
I could agree scientists have to be concerned with foundations ("in biology... mechanism and vitalism"). And even that these are given by "preliminary research... interpreting these beings in terms of the basic constitution of their being... [As with e.g. Kant] working out what belongs to any nature whatsoever".
But, is it true that to decide upon a foundation we need an explicit study into what we mean by 'being'? Isn't that the entire issue at hand that he is trying to argue for: that "the meaning of Being" is an essential question (so he's begging the question).
I don't see how citing the crises of the sciences helps him! Has Being and Time helped mathematicians or scientists define their field? Are biologists at a loss because they haven't agreed on "the meaning of being"?
It seems unlikely to me, though I could see it may be of relevance in the philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind especially.
Has this question been addressed in the huge literature on Heidegger (or foundations), at all?